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TECHNICAL REPORT

What Do Iranians Think?

A Survey of Attitudes on the
United States, the Nuclear Program,
and the Economy

Sara Beth Elson, Alireza Nader

Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited



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Preface

This technical report presents the results of a phone survey of 1,002 Iranians regarding attitudes on a number of issues important to American policymakers and analysts, including U.S.-Iranian relations, the effects of sanctions on the Iranian economy, and the Iranian nuclear program.

This research was conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.

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Summary

The RAND Corporation conducted a phone survey of Iranian public opinion in order to gauge Iranian attitudes on critical issues affecting U.S. interests. Respondents constituted a nationally representative sample of 1,002 members of the Iranian public, age 18 and older, who lived in households with landline telephones, spoke Farsi, and were willing to participate. These respondents participated during December 10–28, 2009.¹ The survey’s goal was to gauge Iranian attitudes on a number of issues important to American analysts and policymakers, including U.S.-Iranian relations, the effects of sanctions, and the Iranian nuclear program. The survey demonstrated that Iranians were divided on certain issues at stake between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States, such as the development of nuclear weapons. But on other issues, including the economy and the prospect of reestablishing U.S.-Iranian ties, respondents expressed more-unified opinions. Our key findings are that

- **A majority of respondents view the economy as being “average” or better**, though many may have hesitated to express their dismay with the economic situation.
- **A majority of respondents did not view sanctions as having a negative effect on the economy**, though a significant number viewed sanctions as having a negative impact. Women, poorer respondents, and those most comfortable with the survey rated the impact of sanctions as most negative.
- **Respondents were divided on the issue of nuclear weapons, with a significant portion favoring their development.** Those most comfortable with the survey, men, and those with the highest level of education expressed the most opposition to development of nuclear weapons. The lower classes and those with the lowest level of education supported the development of nuclear weapons.
- **A majority of respondents expressing an opinion opposed the reestablishment of ties with the United States.** Women and less-educated respondents were least likely to favor the reestablishment of diplomatic relations, but those most comfortable with the survey were more likely to favor such reestablishment.
- In general, gender and education level were important predictors of attitudes. Women and less-educated respondents tended to voice views on security and overall relations that were unfavorable to the United States. Men and those with greater social means tended to be more favorably inclined.
- **Views of historical and current events in U.S.-Iranian relations did not correlate substantially with attitudes toward the reestablishment of relations.** Rather, personalized

¹ For more information on the survey’s methodology, see Appendix A.

views of the American people and the Obama administration played a more-significant role in preferences regarding the reestablishment of relations with the United States.

The findings suggest that many of the Islamic Republic's policies, including opposition to U.S. interests and the pursuit of a nuclear civilian and (possibly) nuclear weapon capability, were supported by a significant portion of the Iranian population. It should be noted, however, that a portion of respondents appeared uncomfortable with participating in the survey, and these respondents tended to express views sympathetic to the Iranian government and its interests. Those who felt most comfortable with the survey tended to express views sympathetic to U.S. interests. Had a larger portion of respondents felt comfortable with the survey, more of them might have expressed support for policies favorable to U.S. interests.²

The extent of popular support for Iranian government policies revealed by respondents may be due to the Islamic Republic's consistent efforts to sway public opinion through its control of most forms of media. The survey revealed that Iranians were highly reliant on state-controlled media and educational sources and did not have extensive access to other sources of information that may provide a positive picture of the United States.³ U.S. broadcasts to Iran and the provision of antifiltering technology to Iranian web users may be beneficial in this regard. In addition, we recommend that policymakers not call particular attention to more-distant historical events in their communications with the Iranian population, as Iranian public opinion tends to focus on personalized images of the Obama administration and of the American people rather than on past events.⁴ Our results also suggest that it is worth considering how opinions differ across subgroups of the Iranian population—such as men and women, those with different educational backgrounds, and those of different classes—when crafting communications meant for the Iranian public.

² Respondents who felt uncomfortable may have feared that their responses were being monitored by government officials. In order to gauge respondents' comfort levels, survey interviewers assessed respondents' tone of voice and pauses. Whenever respondents' comfort level made a difference in the results, we examined how responses to each question differed depending on comfort level.

³ One possible caveat concerns the most-educated respondents. At all levels of educational achievement, respondents were most likely to obtain information from state-dominated media. However, compared with the least-educated respondents, the most-educated respondents reported a slightly higher tendency to obtain information from nongovernment media as well, especially on the topics of the U.S. response to the 2009 Iranian election and the Obama administration's policies for reestablishing relations with Iran. This report's companion website supplies statistics and figures related to this finding.

⁴ Once again, it should be noted that comfort levels with the survey affected responses on a number of issues, thus preventing an exploration of public opinion on "sensitive" topics, such as the 2009 Iranian presidential election. Research on Iranians' use of social media, such as Twitter, blogs, and Facebook, may lead to more in-depth analyses of Iranian public opinion.

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We thank James Dobbins and Michael Lostumbo for their guidance, and we thank Suzanne Maloney, Eric Larson, and Howard Schuman for their thoughtful and helpful reviews of earlier drafts. We gratefully acknowledge the work of Cha-Chi Fan, who spent many long hours consulting and running statistical analyses for this project. Her help was essential and invaluable to this research.

Abbreviations

CATI	Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing
coef	coefficient
KARL	KA Research Limited
PIPA	Program on International Policy Attitudes
RDD	random-digit dialing
RR	response rate
SE	standard error
sig	significance of the coefficient
UN	United Nations
VCC	Virtual Call Center

Introduction

The June 2009 Iranian presidential election and the subsequent popular protests revealed the importance of public opinion in driving change in the Islamic Republic of Iran, a country of strategic importance for the United States. The Islamic Republic arguably poses the most significant threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East. Its ongoing nuclear program and support for various terrorist and insurgent groups have complicated U.S. efforts to achieve stability in Iraq, the Levant, and the Persian Gulf region.

However, Iran has also shown itself to be a country in the throes of great change. The June 2009 election and the creation of the opposition Green Movement have revealed the potential for fundamental political and social change in Iran. The evolution of Iranian politics and society could have wide-ranging implications for U.S. interests and foreign policies.

The political and social transformation of Iran has not been confined to the elite level of Iranian politics; indeed, it has been driven by the Iranian population itself. In June 2009, millions of Iranians took to the streets to challenge an election that they believed was fraudulent, and these protests soon became an expression of mass opposition not only to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad but also the political status quo. The election and its aftermath proved that—despite the outcome of the June election and the militarization of Iranian politics under the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps—Iranian politics is not driven merely by factional competition and elite interests but also by the demands of the population. Hence, recent events in Iran make understanding Iranian public opinion more relevant than ever before.

The RAND Corporation conducted a phone survey of Iranian public opinion in order to gauge Iranian attitudes on critical issues affecting U.S. interests. The survey addressed U.S.-Iranian relations and related topics, such as sanctions, the state of the Iranian economy, and the Iranian nuclear program. The survey delved into public opinion on the United States, examining historical and current factors shaping relations between the two countries. The respondents were also asked to evaluate U.S. policies toward Iran and to offer their opinion on the Obama administration and Iran's nuclear program, including the development of nuclear weapons.

The survey did not directly address such issues as the legitimacy of the presidential election and the Ahmadinejad government because the attendant risks to individual respondents were deemed to be too great in the postelection climate of repression and intimidation.

The survey respondents constituted a nationally representative sample of 1,002 members of the Iranian public, age 18 and older, who lived in households with landline phones, spoke Farsi, and were willing to participate. These respondents participated during December 10–28, 2009.¹ Given the estimated percentage of Iranian households with landline phones (approxi-

¹ For more information on the survey's methodology, see Appendix A.

mately 80 percent), the response rate to the survey (65 percent),² and the lack of information regarding nonrespondents, the current results generalize to 52 percent of Iranian households in total.³ (For detailed information on response rates, see Tables A.3 and A.4 in Appendix A. For demographic characteristics of the sample, see Tables A.6–A.9.) Wherever possible, this survey highlights findings that differ among demographic subgroups of the respondents, as American policymakers may want to account for different attitudes among these groups when preparing speeches aimed at the Iranian public.

Survey interviewers judged how comfortable each respondent appeared to be with the survey because comfort level could have a significant effect on the survey results. According to the interviewers, 62 percent of respondents were comfortable with all questions, 26 percent were comfortable with most of the questions, 9 percent were comfortable with only some of the questions, and 3 percent were generally uncomfortable with the survey. It should be noted that men and women were found to be equally comfortable with the survey, on average. However, respondents who were more educated, earned higher levels of income, and lived in urban areas tended to feel more comfortable with the survey, as judged by interviewers. (See Appendix F for additional discussion of the correlations between demographic variables.)

The remainder of this report presents the survey's findings. Chapter Two provides an analysis of public opinion on the state of the Iranian economy. Chapter Three examines attitudes on the effects of international sanctions on the economy. Chapter Four analyzes opinions on the Iranian nuclear program, including a nuclear weapon capability. Chapter Five examines attitudes on the U.S. government, the American people, and the reestablishment of diplomatic ties between Iran and the United States. We conclude the main body of the report with recommendations for U.S. policymakers.

In parallel with RAND's research on the Iranian political system, we hope that this survey will provide American analysts and policymakers with greater insight into public opinion on important issues of the day, such as the nuclear program, and perhaps enable the United States to devise more-effective policies in light of the evolving political situation in Iran.

² A WorldPublicOpinion.org August–September 2009 survey claimed a response rate of 34.8 percent, the University of Tehran's 2009 tracking surveys claimed an average response rate of 69 percent, and Globescan's June 2009 survey claimed a response rate of 68 percent (Kull et al., 2010).

³ The results do not generalize to households without landline phones, to Iranians who only have cell phones, or to Iranians who are homeless. Several possibilities for broadening the sample are discussed in Chapter Six.

A Majority of Respondents View the Economy as Average or Better

The state of the Iranian economy was perhaps the most important issue for the average Iranian voter during the 2009 presidential campaign. Iran's economy has reportedly experienced a steep decline since President Ahmadinejad's election in 2005. Inflation has ranged from 15 percent to 30 percent,¹ and unemployment has increased significantly. President Ahmadinejad's economic policies, including increased liquidity and massive government expenditures, have led to high inflation, although inflation appears to have decreased somewhat in the last one to two years. Though Iran officially estimates unemployment at about 11 percent,² outside reporting suggests that the unemployment rate is twice as high.³

According to the weighted results,⁴ 28 percent of the survey respondents identified the economy as the most important issue in determining their vote, second only to "the country's security" (which 31 percent of respondents chose).

Given this background, we would have expected strongly negative views of the economy from the survey. However, opinions were mixed and less negative than expected. According to the survey, 29 percent of respondents rated the economy as poor, and 9 percent rated the economy as somewhat poor. However, 47 percent of respondents rated the economy as average, 9 percent rated it as very good, and 5 percent rated it as excellent (see Figure 2.1). It is worth noting, though, that respondents' opinions differed depending on their comfort level with the survey, with the most-comfortable respondents expressing the most-negative opinions of the economy.

The survey results were thus somewhat surprising, especially given various reports on the poor state of the Iranian economy.⁵ The survey was administered before the most recent round of United Nations (UN) and U.S. sanctions, imposed in 2010, so the results may not

¹ "Inflation in Iran Nears 30 Percent in September," 2009.


² The Statistics Center of Iran, no date available.

³ Amuzegar, 2010.

⁴ All the results presented in the report are "weighted" numbers. The purpose of weighting is to ensure that the survey respondents reflect the entire population in Iran. Respondents were randomly selected from among landline phone users in Iran. However, in comparing the proportions of different demographic groups in the population with the proportions of these groups in our sample, we found slight differences in the proportions, according to province. In weighting the data, we multiplied each result by a fraction that corrects for the difference between the sample and population proportions of respondents from each province. In the current survey, we found that applying these sampling weights by province made no difference in any of the results. Therefore, we present only the weighted results throughout this report.

⁵ Although respondents' discomfort and nervousness regarding the survey account for some of the positive ratings of the economy, they are not the sole explanation.

Figure 2.1
How Do You Rate the Current Economic Situation in Iran?



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fully reflect public opinion on the effects of those sanctions. Nevertheless, the survey results suggest that Iranians' perception of the economy was not as negative as typically assumed by some analysts and commentators.

We explored whether respondents' overall views of the economy depended on their views of their personal economic circumstances, their class,⁶ their gender, or their level of urbanization. We controlled for respondents' demographic characteristics and for a set of additional variables. (See Appendix G for a full discussion of the covariates and all statistics associated with this model.) According to this analysis, respondents' overall views of the economy did depend on their views of their personal economic situation. That is, the higher their rating of their own personal economic situation, the better the respondents rated the economy overall. However, respondents' class, gender, and level of urbanization did not predict views of the economy overall.

When asked, "What is the ideal role of the government in managing the economy?" about half of respondents (52 percent) identified job creation as the ideal role for government, reflecting concerns about the high unemployment rate affecting a broad section of the Iranian population. The next-greatest portion (17 percent) answered "management." Only 1 percent answered "inflation control."

A high percentage of respondents (40 percent) identified Japan as the best economic model for Iran to follow. This fits the general pattern of respect afforded to Japan by many Iranians, who view that country as a successful and industrialized non-Western power.

A large percentage of Iranians (23 percent) viewed Iran itself as being a worthy economic model, perhaps demonstrating the positive view of Iran's economy held by many Iranians.⁷

⁶ Respondents rated their own class as "upper," "middle," "working," or "poor."

⁷ On the other hand, concerns about being heard by the authorities could have led some respondents to praise the Iranian economy when they might not otherwise.

Surprisingly, only 8 percent of respondents viewed China as being the best economic model, despite that country's fast economic growth and increasing weight on the international stage. The United States was identified in a meager 3 percent of the responses.


The respondents' negative attitudes toward the United States as an economic model are somewhat surprising. After all, many Iranians are eager to immigrate to countries with advanced economies, such as the United States, to escape Iran's relatively anemic economy. However, Iranians may still be influenced by negative views of capitalism dating from the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which was strongly influenced by leftist and socialist ideologies. Furthermore, respondents' attitudes regarding the United States may have been shaped by government propaganda on the "decline" of the U.S. economy due to the financial crisis and on the resulting "decline" of the United States as a global economic power.

A Majority of Respondents Did Not View Sanctions as Having a Negative Effect on the Economy

UN and U.S. sanctions on Iran are being used against the Islamic Republic in order to shape its behavior regarding its nuclear program. The United States and its partners among the permanent members of the UN Security Council (plus Germany) have pursued a policy of engagement coupled with strengthened sanctions in order to resolve the nuclear impasse with Iran.

Iran's economy has undoubtedly been damaged by 30 years of U.S. sanctions and by more-recent UN sanctions levied in response to Iran's nuclear program. However, the survey revealed that, overall, half the respondents either saw sanctions as a positive force or believed that they have had no impact—arguments that have been advanced strenuously and repeatedly by the Iranian government for years. This finding may reflect some success in the Iranian government's efforts to depict sanctions as “worthless” (see Figure 3.1). It should be noted, however, that the survey took place before the 2010 round of UN and U.S. sanctions against Iran, which have had a bigger impact on the Iranian economy than have prior sanctions.¹

Figure 3.1
Opinions on Whether the International Sanctions Have Affected the Iranian Economy



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¹ Fassihi, 2010.


Although many of those surveyed felt that economic sanctions have affected the Iranian economy negatively, different patterns emerged across different subgroups. For example, a greater proportion of women than men said that sanctions have had a negative effect on the economy (see Figure 3.2).² Specifically, almost half of women (48 percent) said that sanctions have affected the economy negatively, and 20 percent said that the sanctions have affected the economy positively. Roughly a quarter (27 percent) said that the sanctions have had neither a positive nor a negative effect on the economy.

On the other hand, 42 percent of men said that sanctions have affected the economy negatively, and 23 percent said that sanctions have affected the economy positively. Roughly one-third (33 percent) said that the sanctions have had neither a positive nor a negative effect.

People's opinions on the sanctions also differ according to class. The lower classes are thought to form the main support base for the Islamic Republic under the leadership of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad. The Islamic Republic bases part of its legitimacy on its efforts to correct social inequality and redistribute national wealth for the sake of the *mostaz'afin* [the dispossessed]. Hence, the Iranian government has constructed a vast economic patronage system to support the lower classes and ensure their ideological and political loyalty to Ayatollah Khamenei. As president, Ahmadinejad promised to put oil money on Iranians' tables, and he has pursued major economic-development projects in the provinces. However, the lower classes may in fact be the most vulnerable to sanctions.

The survey revealed that a greater proportion of poor respondents expressed negative views about the impact of sanctions than did any of the other classes (see Figure 3.3).³ Specifically, 56 percent of poor respondents said that sanctions have affected the Iranian economy

Figure 3.2
Opinions on How Sanctions Have Affected the Iranian Economy Differ by Gender




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² $\chi^2 = 10.59, p < 0.01$.

³ $\chi^2 = 39.28, p < 0.01$. Appendix H contains a more-detailed version of this and other charts. The more-detailed charts include categories containing extremely small numbers of people, such as those who refused to identify their class or did not know it. Such categories contained too few people to warrant being depicted in the main body of this report.

Figure 3.3
Opinions on How Sanctions Have Affected the Iranian Economy Differ by Class



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negatively, and 17 percent said that sanctions have affected the economy positively. Roughly one-fifth (23 percent) said that sanctions have had neither a positive nor a negative effect. In contrast, 42 percent of middle-class respondents said that sanctions have had a negative effect, and 24 percent said that sanctions have had a positive effect. Roughly one-third (31 percent) of these middle-class respondents said that sanctions have had neither a positive nor a negative effect.

Finally, respondents expressed different opinions depending on how comfortable they were with the survey, suggesting that fear about government eavesdropping may have played some role in their responses (see Figure 3.4). Specifically, respondents were more likely to say that sanctions have affected the economy negatively when they felt comfortable with the entire survey than when they felt comfortable with less than the entire survey.⁴


Among respondents who felt comfortable with the entire survey, almost half (48 percent) said that sanctions have affected the economy negatively, and 22 percent said that sanctions have affected the economy positively. Almost one-third (28 percent) said that sanctions have had neither a positive nor a negative effect on the economy. In contrast, respondents who were not completely comfortable with the survey were less willing to say that sanctions have had a negative effect on Iran's economy.

Nevertheless, the survey demonstrates that a significant portion of the Iranian population did not view sanctions as having a negative effect on Iran's economy. This may limit the efficacy of sanctions as a tool to shape the Iranian government's decisionmaking regarding the country's nuclear program.⁵

⁴ $\chi^2 = 64.53, p < 0.01$.

⁵ The one exception may be the lower classes, since more than half of the lower-class respondents reported that sanctions have had a negative impact on the economy. Because the lower classes are vulnerable to sanctions and reportedly constitute a base of support for the government, sanctions may cause them to put pressure on the government.

Figure 3.4
Opinions on How Economic Sanctions Have Affected the Economy Differ Depending on Comfort Level with the Survey



Respondents Were Divided on Nuclear Weaponization, with a Significant Portion Supporting Development of Nuclear Weapons

The Iranian nuclear program has become the defining issue in the Islamic Republic's relations with not only the United States but also much of the international community. Though the Iranian government claims that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only, the Islamic Republic's lack of adherence to International Atomic Energy Agency standards and its secretive approach to the program have led to suspicions that the program also serves military purposes.

The Iranian public's attitudes toward the nuclear program have not been entirely clear. Some analysts have speculated that most, or at least many, Iranians are opposed to their country possessing actual nuclear weapons.¹ According to a January 2008 survey by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland and by WorldPublicOpinion.org, 66 percent of Iranian respondents supported Iran having "a full fuel cycle nuclear energy program" but thought that Iran "should not develop nuclear weapons."² However, a June 2007 survey by Terror Free Tomorrow claims that "a majority of Iranians (52%) . . . favor the development of nuclear weapons and believe that the people of Iran would live in a safer world if Iran possessed nuclear weapons."³ Our survey demonstrates that most respondents favored the nuclear program for civilian use and that a plurality opposed the development of nuclear weapons. However, support for actual nuclear weapons was, somewhat surprisingly, stronger than previously assumed. In particular, women, those with lower incomes, and those with less education were more likely to support the development of nuclear weapons.

Of those surveyed, 87 percent strongly favored Iranian development of nuclear energy for civilian use (see Figure 4.1). Only 3 percent of respondents strongly opposed developing nuclear energy for civilian use. In addition, 98 percent believed that the possession of nuclear energy is a national right. This finding suggests there may be widespread support for the civilian aspect of the nuclear program, which could be helping the Iranian government weather international pressure designed to curtail its program.

However, a plurality of respondents opposed the development of nuclear weapons, with 41 percent strongly opposing their development and 5 percent somewhat opposing their development (see Figure 4.2).


Thirty-two percent of respondents strongly favored the development of nuclear weapons, and 11 percent somewhat favored their development. A sizable number of respondents (48 percent) believed that the possession of nuclear weapons is a national right, whereas 42 per-

¹ Gwertzman, 2006.

² WorldPublicOpinion.org, 2008.


³ Terror Free Tomorrow, 2008.

Figure 4.1
Support for and Opposition to Developing Nuclear Energy for Civilian Use



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Figure 4.2
Support for and Opposition to Developing Nuclear Weapons




RAND TR910-4.2

cent believed that it is not a national right. These findings are surprising, especially because Iranian authorities often assert that the development of nuclear weapons is un-Islamic and against Iranian interests. According to the January 2008 PIPA survey, 58 percent of respondents thought that “producing nuclear weapons is against the principles of Islam.”⁴ One might assume that respondents to our survey would also have strongly opposed the development of nuclear weapons, especially given the high economic, political, and even ethical costs of that development. Nevertheless, a significant number of respondents supported the development of nuclear weapons, especially lower-class Iranians, who are reported to be more influenced by President Ahmadinejad’s policies and rhetoric.

Several individual characteristics may have accounted for the variation in responses. Comfort level with the survey is one, suggesting that the issue of nuclear weapons is a sensitive topic for Iranians. Among respondents who felt most comfortable with the survey, approximately half (52 percent) opposed the development of nuclear weapons, and a minority (39 percent) favored such development (see Figure 4.3). On the other hand, as comfort with the survey dropped, lower percentages of respondents opposed the development of nuclear weapons. For example, among respondents who felt comfortable with “most” questions as opposed to all of them, a minority (41 percent) opposed the development. Among those comfortable with only some questions, 31 percent opposed the development, and, among those uncomfortable with the survey, 10 percent opposed the development.⁵

Figure 4.3
Support for and Opposition to Developing Nuclear Weapons Differ by Comfort Level with the Survey



⁴ WorldPublicOpinion.org, 2008.


⁵ The overall pattern is statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 61.13, p < 0.01$). These findings suggest that if more respondents had felt comfortable with the survey, more may have expressed opposition to the development of nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, opinion was still divided on this issue.

Other differences emerged as a function of income level. For example, those earning higher incomes tended to oppose the development of nuclear weapons, and those earning lower incomes tended to favor it (see Figure 4.4).⁶

Furthermore, respondents also expressed different attitudes on nuclear weapons depending on their education level (see Figure 4.5; a more-detailed version appears in Appendix H). Among more-educated respondents (i.e., among those who had at least finished high school), a plurality expressed opposition to the development of nuclear weapons. Among the most-educated respondents (i.e., among those who had at least graduated from college), a majority (57 percent) opposed the development of nuclear weapons, and a minority (37 percent) expressed support. However, the reverse was true among less-educated respondents, with the majority of those who had finished only some elementary school (56 percent) or some intermediate school (54 percent) expressing support for the development of nuclear weapons.⁷

Gender also played a role, with men and women expressing differing attitudes on nuclear weapons. Specifically, a plurality of women (47 percent) favored the development of nuclear weapons, and a slight majority of men (53 percent) opposed such development (see Figure 4.6).⁸

Figure 4.4
Support for and Opposition to Developing Nuclear Weapons Differ by Income




RAND TR910-4.4

⁶ $\chi^2 = 48, p < 0.05$.

⁷ The overall pattern of differences in responding was statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 68.62, p < 0.01$).


⁸ The overall effect of gender is statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 25, p < 0.01$).

Figure 4.5
Support for and Opposition to Developing Nuclear Weapons Differ by Education Level



RAND TR910-4.5


Figure 4.6
Support for and Opposition to Developing Nuclear Weapons Differ by Gender



RAND TR910-4.6

Respondents of different ages also expressed different opinions on nuclear weapons. Interestingly, respondents in both the youngest and oldest age categories showed similar patterns, with approximately 50 percent of respondents ages 18–29 and 60–69 favoring the development of nuclear weapons and approximately 39 percent in both categories opposing it (see Figure 4.7; a more-detailed version appears in Appendix H). However, the reverse was true among respondents ages 30–59, with at least half of the respondents in each relevant age group opposing the development of nuclear weapons and minorities favoring such development.⁹

Figure 4.7
Support for and Opposition to Developing Nuclear Weapons Differ by Age



RAND TR910-4.7

⁹ $\chi^2 = 47.13, p < 0.01$.

A Majority of Respondents Expressing an Opinion Opposed the Reestablishment of Ties with the United States, Though a Significant Segment Was Supportive

Iranians are generally believed to be one of the most pro-American populations in the Middle East,¹ whereas the Iranian regime itself is arguably the most anti-American government in the region. Hence, it may seem natural that most Iranians would support the reestablishment of relations with the United States. According to a report on a September 2009 PIPA survey, 60 percent of all Iranians favored full, unconditional negotiations between the government of Iran and the government of the United States. The report also states that a postelection poll carried out in June 2009 by Globe Scan, which asked what respondents thought of “[p]ursuing direct talks with the US to resolve the problems between the two countries,” found that 58 percent of Iranians favored this step. Furthermore, the PIPA survey found that 63 percent of all Iranians “favor[ed] Iran and the United States restoring diplomatic relations, while 27 percent were opposed.”²


Our survey, conducted at the end of December 2009, revealed different Iranian perceptions of the United States and U.S.-Iranian relations. When asked whether they favored or opposed reestablishing relations with the United States, a plurality of respondents (45 percent) voiced opposition (34 percent were very opposed, and 11 percent were somewhat opposed). Only 39 percent favored reestablishing relations (19 percent very in favor, and 20 percent were somewhat in favor). Approximately 13 percent stated that they are neither in favor nor opposed to reestablishing relations (see Figure 5.1).

However, respondents expressed different levels of support for or opposition to reestablishing relations with the United States depending on how comfortable they seemed to be with the survey (see Figure 5.2). The effect of comfort level is particularly important to consider, given the apparent discomfort of some respondents observed during pretesting. This discomfort is not unexpected, especially considering the political sensitivities surrounding the issue of U.S.-Iranian relations. After the 2009 presidential election, the Iranian government accused the U.S. government of supporting the Green Movement, and these claims were followed by show trials of reformist/Green Movement activists allegedly supported by outside powers, including the United States. Improved relations with the United States was a regular topic of discussion among the elite prior to the election but has become much more controversial and sensitive since the election and the subsequent mass protests against the government. It is pos-

¹ Moaveni, 2008.


² Kull et al., 2010.

Figure 5.1
Opinions on Reestablishing Relations with the United States



RAND TR910-5.1

Figure 5.2
Support for and Opposition to Reestablishing Relations with the United States Differ by Comfort Level with the Survey



RAND TR910-5.2


sible, therefore, that respondents who seemed least comfortable with the survey were afraid that government officials were monitoring the survey call.

Among respondents who seemed most comfortable with the survey, there was a nearly even split between those supporting (43 percent) and opposing (41 percent) the reestablishment of relations with the United States. (For the sake of clarity, we have combined the “very” and “somewhat” options in each case, thereby collapsing support and opposition into single categories.) Approximately 13 percent said they were neither in favor nor opposed. However, respondents who seemed less comfortable with the survey expressed more opposition than support.³

These results suggest that respondents’ comfort level with the survey, as assessed by the interviewers, played an important role in expressions of support for or opposition to reestablishing relations with the United States. Those who seemed most comfortable with the survey expressed support and opposition in roughly equal percentages, but those who seemed less comfortable with the survey voiced opposition in greater numbers than those voicing support.

With regard to gender, the results show a stark contrast in attitudes between women and men. A plurality of male respondents (46 percent) favored reestablishing relations with the United States, and a majority of female respondents (53 percent) opposed reestablishing relations (see Figure 5.3).⁴ Because women and men were judged as equally comfortable with the survey, comfort level was probably not responsible for this difference. It is unclear why women, compared with men, tended to be more opposed to the reestablishment of relations.

Figure 5.3
Support for and Opposition to Reestablishing Relations with the United States Differ by Gender



RAND TR910-5.3


³ The overall pattern support for and opposition to reestablishing relations as a function of comfort level was statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 65.53, p < 0.01$).

⁴ $\chi^2 = 35.78, p < 0.01$.

Education level is another predictor of differences in support for and opposition to reestablishing relations with the United States (see Figure 5.4; a more-detailed version appears in Appendix H). Half (50 percent) of college-educated respondents said they were in favor of reestablishing relations with the United States (we have once again combined the “very” and “somewhat” options), and 30 percent said they were opposed to reestablishing these relations. Approximately 17 percent neither supported nor opposed reestablishing these relations.

However, as respondents’ level of education decreased, support for reestablishing relations with the United States decreased, and opposition grew. For example, 42 percent of respondents who finished some college said they were in favor of reestablishing relations, an approximately equal percentage (40 percent) expressed opposition, and approximately 14 percent expressed neither support nor opposition. Among those who finished secondary school or less, however, pluralities voiced opposition to reestablishing relations with the United States.⁵ As with gender, it is worth noting that, at all education levels, a substantial percentage of respondents favored reestablishing relations with the United States.

Figure 5.4
Support for and Opposition to Reestablishing Relations with the United States Differ by Education Level




RAND TR910-5.4

Focusing on class differences, the results suggest that upper-class respondents were more likely than others to favor the reestablishment of ties: 71 percent of upper-class respondents favored the reestablishment of ties, and 25 percent opposed it (see Figure 5.5; a more-detailed version appears in Appendix H). Lower percentages of the middle, working, and poor classes favored the reestablishment of ties.

⁵ $\chi^2 = 56.19, p < 0.01$.

Figure 5.5
Support for and Opposition to Reestablishing Relations with the United States Differ by Class



RAND TR910-5.5

The question of reestablishing ties with the United States reveals the deep divisions within Iranian society. On the one hand, the Green Movement and the reformist political elite, who derive much of their support from the middle and upper classes, favor more-cooperative foreign policies that include the possibility of détente with the United States. On the other hand, Iran's conservative political establishment, assumed to be more strongly supported by the lower classes, is reluctant to support (or is even hostile toward) the idea of reestablishing ties with the Islamic Republic's ideological archenemy. Of course, it is somewhat simplistic to state that the Green Movement is simply supported by the middle and upper classes and that Ayatollah Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad derive support mostly from the lower classes. The 2009 presidential election and the subsequent protests revealed strong support for reformist candidate Mir Hussein Mousavi across all sectors of Iranian society.

Nevertheless, Iranians with higher incomes and more education are one of the driving forces of the reform movement and of opposition in Iran. They tend to have greater contact with the outside world, especially the West and the United States, and greater access to alternative sources of information. They are also less likely to be swayed by the Iranian government's propaganda on such issues as U.S.-Iranian relations and the nuclear program.

However, those Iranians who support policies more favorable to U.S. interests have also been marginalized from the political system, especially under President Ahmadinejad's administration. Though it has lost much legitimacy since the 2009 election, the Islamic Republic nevertheless appears to maintain enough support among the Iranian population to continue to oppose the United States and pursue a nuclear capability.

Opinions on the Reestablishment of Ties Correlate with Current Perceptions of the American People and the Obama Administration

Negative Iranian perceptions of the United States have been shaped by historical events, especially the United States–organized 1953 coup against Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh. President Barack Obama acknowledged the U.S. role in the 1953 coup in his 2009 Cairo speech to the Muslim world.⁶ Previous U.S. administrations, including the Clinton administration, have also acknowledged the role of the 1953 coup in shaping U.S.-Iranian relations.

The 1953 coup still plays a role in shaping Iranian attitudes toward the United States. Out of 1,002 respondents, 52 percent reported that the 1953 coup calls to mind very negative attitudes toward the United States.

As expected, when asked to reflect on the U.S. role during the 1979 revolution, most respondents said that it calls to mind very negative attitudes toward the United States, with 61 percent of respondents defining these as very negative and another 11 percent characterizing them as somewhat negative. A minority of respondents viewed the U.S. role in that historic event as either very positive (4 percent) or somewhat positive (3 percent). Similarly, 76 percent of respondents viewed the U.S. role in the Iran-Iraq War as very negative.

Though historical events have played an important role in shaping Iranian perceptions of the United States, the survey suggested that opinions on the reestablishment of ties between the two countries are less related to these events than to current assessments of the American people and the Obama administration. This is discussed in greater detail later in this section.

Asked to reflect on a more current issue—i.e., whether Iran and the United States have mostly converging or mostly diverging interests—most respondents (62 percent) believed that Iran and the United States have mostly diverging interests, and 8 percent believed that the countries have mostly converging interests. Others (16 percent) reported a roughly equal mix of both converging and diverging interests.

Of those who believed that the two countries have mostly divergent interests, 32 percent identified the nuclear program as the most-divergent interest, and 10 percent identified the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the most-divergent issue.

Though a majority of the respondents viewed the U.S. government and its policies toward Iran negatively, around half held positive views of the American people: 28 percent reported very favorable views, and 24 percent reported somewhat favorable views. (Another 20 percent of respondents reported neither favorable nor unfavorable views of the American people.) Only 8 percent of the respondents had a somewhat unfavorable view of the American people, and only 9 percent viewed Americans very unfavorably.

Nevertheless, the majority of respondents reported negative views of American cultural influences in Iran, with 46 percent reporting very unfavorable views and 19 percent reporting somewhat unfavorable views. Only 11 percent of respondents reported very favorable or somewhat favorable views. These results cast some doubt on widespread assumptions about Iranians' fondness for certain American cultural and political norms and values, or they may indicate Iranian affinity for American culture among only a narrow segment of the Iranian population. Nevertheless, it is not entirely clear from the survey which American cultural norms Iranians tend to reject or accept.

⁶ "Obama Admits US Involvement in 1953 Coup," 2009.

There has been much hope that President Obama (whose middle name is Hussein, the name of the widely revered third Shi'a imam) will, as U.S. President, resonate strongly among the Iranian population, perhaps improving the chances for dialogue between the two countries and providing a solution to the nuclear standoff. However, the survey revealed that Iranians do not necessarily regard the Obama administration much differently than they did previous U.S. administrations.

When asked whether President Obama's election will improve U.S.-Iranian relations, only 3 percent of respondents stated that relations were likely to get much better, and 16 percent responded that relations were likely to get somewhat better. A majority of respondents (55 percent) believed that U.S.-Iranian relations would stay the same, and a total of 17 percent believed that relations would actually become worse or much worse.

Roughly half of the respondents had either a somewhat unfavorable (19 percent) or very unfavorable (33 percent) view of the Obama administration. Only 8 percent viewed it very favorably, and 11 percent viewed it somewhat favorably.

To take a more in-depth look at what factors might correlate with support for or opposition to reestablishing relations with the United States, we examined attitudes toward different facets of the United States. Specifically, we tested a model of whether attitudes toward the current U.S. government, the American people, U.S. policies toward Iran, the Obama administration, and American cultural influences within Iran might predict support for reestablishing relations with the United States. We predicted that each of these facets would have some relation to the desire (or lack thereof) to reestablish ties. (See Appendix G for details of this model.) However, we found that only attitudes toward the American people and the Obama administration strongly predict levels of support or opposition to reestablishing relations. For example, compared with respondents who expressed unfavorable attitudes toward the American people, respondents who expressed favorable attitudes toward the American people tended to support reestablishing relations with the United States. In addition, compared with respondents who expressed unfavorable attitudes toward the Obama administration, those who expressed favorable attitudes toward the Obama administration tended to support reestablishing relations with the United States. Because the "American people" and the "Obama administration" are personalized images of the United States, Iranians might find that these images resonate with them in a more personal way than do other topics and concepts that are more esoteric.

Given the tumultuous history of relations between Iran and the United States throughout most of the previous century, we examined whether attitudes on past U.S. involvement in Iran or on the Obama administration's current policies might have greater bearing on support for or opposition to reestablishing relations with the United States. In particular, we tested a model of how support for and opposition to reestablishing relations with the United States might depend on attitudes toward (1) the U.S. response to the 2009 presidential elections in Iran, (2) the Obama administration's policies regarding the reestablishment of U.S.-Iranian relations, (3) the U.S. role in the 1979 revolution, (4) the U.S. role during the Iran-Iraq War, and (5) the U.S. role in the 1953 coup in Iran. We predicted that attitudes toward both historical and current events would play an equal role in accounting for attitudes toward reestablishing relations with the United States. (See Appendix G for details of this model.)

The results show that only attitudes on the Obama administration's current policies on reestablishing U.S.-Iranian relations predicted support or opposition to reestablishing relations with the United States. For example, compared with those who expressed negative attitudes toward the Obama administration's policies on reestablishing U.S.-Iranian relations,

those who expressed positive attitudes were more likely to express support for reestablishing those relations. Interestingly, attitudes toward the U.S. role in the 1979 revolution, toward the U.S. position during the Iran-Iraq War, toward the U.S. role in the 1953 coup, and toward the U.S. response to the 2009 presidential election did not predict support for or opposition to reestablishing relations. It is possible that respondents reacted more strongly to the personalized image of Barack Obama's policies on reestablishing relations than to the other topics.

Iranians Were Highly Reliant on Government-Controlled Media and Educational Sources for Information

The survey revealed that Iranians were highly reliant on government-controlled media and educational sources for information on a variety of topics, including the United States and important historical events that have shaped U.S.-Iranian relations.⁷

Only 1 percent of respondents learned of the 1953 coup from firsthand experience, only 17 percent learned about the Islamic Revolution from firsthand experience, and only 21 percent of respondents obtained their information on the Iran-Iraq War from firsthand experience.

Iran's official government media and educational system have played a crucial role in shaping Iranian perceptions of U.S. involvement in these historic events. Of those surveyed, 34 percent reported learning of the coup through educational sources, and 32 percent obtained their information through Iran's official media. Moreover, 23 percent of respondents learned of the 1979 revolution through educational sources, and 39 percent obtained their information from Iran's state-controlled media.

Such results reflect the role of information, and who controls it, in shaping not only public opinion but overall state policy in Iran. Many Iranians are dissatisfied with Iran's state of affairs, and they clearly expressed their frustration in the protests following the June 2009 presidential election. However, opposition to the Islamic Republic's status quo does not necessarily translate into overwhelming support for U.S. foreign policies. Past U.S.-Iranian relations have undoubtedly created a state of hostility between the two nations and a culture of distrust and suspicion among the wider Iranian population. Yet, past events, namely the 1953 coup and the Islamic Revolution, may have become less important in shaping Iranian perceptions of the United States over the past several decades. The world has changed much since 1953 and 1979, but the world of U.S.-Iranian relations, or at least of each country's perceptions of the other, appears to have changed very little. This is partially due to the mutual unawareness caused by the absence of official and cultural ties between the two nations. The absence of a U.S. diplomatic presence in Iran has not only impeded U.S.-Iranian relations but has also arguably led to an increase in tensions between the two countries. Iranians lack sufficient information to judge the United States and its policies; more importantly, they lack a variety of sources for obtaining information.

⁷ As noted earlier in the report, one possible caveat concerns the most-educated respondents. At all levels of educational achievement, respondents were most likely to obtain information from state-dominated media. However, compared with the least-educated respondents, the most-educated respondents reported a slightly higher tendency to obtain information from nongovernment media as well, especially on the topics of the U.S. response to the 2009 Iranian election and the Obama administration's policies for reestablishing relations with Iran. This report's companion website supplies statistics and figures related to this finding.

The survey's respondents reported obtaining much of their information from either educational resources or the official media. Education in Iran at all levels is still largely either controlled or regulated by the state. Iran's media, and hence the country's information environment, is largely dominated by the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting. Independent media in the form of newspapers and websites do exist, but they are heavily censored by the Iranian government.

Only 2 percent of respondents who learned about the Islamic Revolution relied on non-governmental media as their primary source of information. Similar numbers were reported for learning about the 1953 coup and the Iran-Iraq War. Hence, it is easy to see why many Iranians viewed the Obama administration's engagement efforts toward Iran in such a negative light. A vast majority of respondents (77 percent) identified Iran's official media as their primary source of information regarding the Obama administration's policies on the reestablishment of U.S.-Iranian relations.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Conducting Future Surveys

The results of this survey suggest a number of insights into Iranian public opinion that were not previously understood. However, it is crucial to keep in mind that the results generalize only to slightly more than half of Iranian households. With no ability to operate on the ground, and considering the discomfort felt by many of our respondents as they discussed political attitudes over the phone, it is important to view the results as suggestive of the attitudes of a specific portion of Iranian society rather than as representative of the entire society. That is, the survey captured the attitudes of those who lived in households with landline phones, spoke Farsi, and were willing to participate in a phone survey. Because this survey does not represent all of Iranian public opinion, it should be taken in conjunction with many other types of studies on Iran, including surveys and other studies of popular opinion.

Several steps could be taken to increase either the sample of respondents or the ability to generalize results to the Iranian population. For example, the current survey did not include cell-phone users; future surveys could do so. In addition, future surveys could include more-elaborate plans for recruiting nonrespondents into the survey or could attempt to learn as much as possible about nonrespondents' demographic characteristics. Aside from surveys, it would be possible to conduct focus groups or to interview people who travel back and forth between Iran and other countries. Doing so could provide greater insight into Iranians' attitudes and provide a means of researching ways to make surveys less intimidating to Iranians.

One intriguing set of findings concerns the gender differences in attitudes that held across multiple questions. In particular, women were less supportive of reestablishing relations with the United States than men were, and proportionately more women than men viewed sanctions as having a negative effect on the economy. It should be noted that women did not seem to be any less comfortable with the survey than men were. Follow-up research might examine the attitudes of women more carefully to understand what causes most women to oppose reestablishing relations with the United States and to express more-negative attitudes about conditions within their country.

It is worth remembering that discomfort with the survey played a significant role in some responses, including to the question of reestablishing relations with the United States, with the least-comfortable respondents expressing the most opposition to reestablishing these relations. Therefore, future surveys should measure the extent to which respondents are comfortable answering survey questions.

One way of examining attitudes on taboo topics (i.e., the Supreme Leader, the Revolutionary Guards, and other topics that cannot be discussed on the phone) is through the

examination of Iranians' use of the Internet. For example, social-media outlets, such as Twitter, blogs, and Facebook, played an important role in mobilizing protesters during the June 2009 presidential election. As such, the opinions posted on these outlets may provide a window into attitudes that are otherwise unknowable.

Survey Findings

The results of our survey suggest that Iranian society and its views of the United States are far from monolithic. Indeed, our respondents were deeply divided on issues that define Iranian politics, including the state of the economy, the nuclear program, and U.S.-Iranian relations. Many respondents viewed the economy as being in a poor state, though negative attitudes toward the economy were not as strong as expected, with many respondents rating the economy as average. Nonetheless, those who felt worst about their own personal economic situation tended to rate the economy the worst, and half of respondents said that the ideal role for the government is to create more jobs. Furthermore, many Iranians did not consider sanctions to be a significant worry, a finding that may change ideas about the effectiveness of sanctions used by the United States vis-à-vis the Iranian nuclear program.¹ However, it should be noted that the survey measured opinions on sanctions before the 2010 round of UN and U.S. sanctions against Iran.

Survey respondents expressed overwhelming support for the nuclear civilian program. Moreover, though a plurality of respondents opposed the development of nuclear weapons, a significant portion of the respondents supported nuclear weaponization.

A majority of respondents expressing an opinion did not want to reestablish relations with the United States, though a substantial segment of the sample, including men and many well-educated respondents, did favor the reestablishment of diplomatic ties. Attitudes toward the Obama administration emerged as a strong predictor of support or opposition to reestablishing relations, as did attitudes toward the American people.

However, Iranians' views of both recent and distant historical events, such as the U.S. role in the 1953 coup and the U.S. position during the Iran-Iraq War, did not predict attitudes toward reestablishing ties. The results of this survey suggest that policymakers should not call particular attention to more-distant historical events in their communications with the Iranian population. Rather, it may be more advisable to refer to the American people, since a greater proportion of respondents expressed positive attitudes toward Americans than toward any other item. It should be noted, though, that the proportion expressing positive attitudes toward Americans was roughly 50 percent.

The survey results suggest that the United States will face difficulties in shaping the Iranian government's behavior on such issues as U.S.-Iranian relations and the nuclear program, in part because of the popular support afforded to government policies by the lower classes, the Islamic Republic's traditional constituency. Ayatollah Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad may have lost much legitimacy since the 2009 election, yet they (or their policies) are supported by a significant portion of the Iranian population. This support may, to some extent, be attributable to the Iranian government's control of the information environment in Iran. Yet,

¹ The one exception is the lower classes, as discussed in an earlier chapter.

the survey also revealed among the lower classes significant discontent with the economy and a widespread belief that sanctions have affected the economy negatively.

Iranians get much of their information about the United States and the historical relationship between the two countries from government-controlled media and the educational system. The survey showed that Iranians who are better educated were more supportive of reestablishing relations with the United States. One reason for this may be that better-educated citizens have greater access to independent sources of information and, therefore, may be more likely to have a positive image of the United States. Hence, efforts to break the Iranian government's monopoly on information through foreign broadcasts and the provision of antifiltering technology to Iranian web users may be critical in shaping opinions regarding the United States, especially after the 2009 presidential election. The survey has demonstrated that Iranians with higher incomes, higher levels of education, and access to multiple sources of information may be more supportive of Iranian policies that are more favorable to U.S. interests. U.S. policies meant to shape Iranian behavior may be more effective if they focus on this particular sector of the Iranian population.

Methodology and Survey Management

Methodology

Working with D3 Systems and KA Research Limited (KARL), RAND conducted a random-digit dialing (RDD) telephone survey during December 10–28, 2009. Respondents constituted a nationally representative sample of 1,002 members of the Iranian public, age 18 and older, who lived in households with landline phones, spoke Farsi, and were willing to participate. As such, this survey excludes respondents who were homeless, who used only cell phones, or whose households did not have fixed landline telephones. Interviews were conducted via landlines from a neighboring country using Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) technology. All interviewers were native Farsi-language speakers, and these interviewers (and their supervisors) worked under the management of D3 Systems and KARL. Successful interviews lasted between nine minutes and 56 minutes, and the average length of a successful interview was 18 minutes.

Questionnaire

The questionnaire was developed in English and translated into Farsi (see Appendix C for the English-language version; see Appendix E for the Farsi-language version). KARL staff translated the questionnaire into Farsi, and a third-party translation team at Comprehensive Language Services reviewed the translation. The third-party translators were given access to the English questionnaire so that they could compare the translation generated by KARL to the English version. One of the RAND principal investigators, a native speaker of Farsi, reviewed the final translation. Finally, RAND and managers from D3 Systems and KARL discussed the translation to ensure that the translators not only created a technically correct translation but also understood the meaning and subtext of the questions.

Pretesting

Several weeks prior to fielding the survey, RAND pretested the questionnaire in order to ensure that respondents understood all questions as intended and to check for any discomfort with particular questions. After pretesting, some questions were reworded to improve clarity. The RAND principal investigator who speaks Farsi listened unobtrusively to some of the pretest interviews and discovered that some participants expressed discomfort at questions concerning the United States. Therefore, participants' comfort levels, as judged by the interview-

ers, are reported in the case of several findings (especially those concerning attitudes toward the United States).

Sampling

Iran's population is estimated at 73.3 million.¹ According to the Statistics Center of Iran, the Iranian population is mostly urban (66.3 percent).² Iran has 30 provinces: Ardabil, Azerbaijan-e Gharbi, Azarbaijan-e Sharqi, Bushehr, Chaharmahal va Bakhtiari, Esfahan, Fars, Gilan, Golestan, Hamadan, Hormozgan, Ilam, Kerman, Kermanshah, Khorasan-e Jonubi (South), Khorasan-e Razavi, Khorasan-e Shomali (North), Khuzestan, Kohgiluyeh va Boyerahmad, Kordestan, Lorestan, Markazi, Mazandaran, Qazvin, Qom, Semnan, Sistan va Baluchestan, Tehran, Yazd, and Zanzan.³ The federal capital, Tehran, is located in Tehran province. Tehran is by far the largest province in terms of population size (19 percent). For a full list of provinces and proportions of the population contained in each, see Table A.1.

In a multistage selection process, sampling first took place across regions and urban and rural strata. Sampling points were distributed by using different telephone exchange numbers for the country. All sampling points (i.e., exchange numbers) available for each province in the sample list were included, with no quota for sample points. Households were selected by generating random numbers (i.e., the last four digits of telephone numbers) in Microsoft Excel. Finally, respondents were selected via the last-birthday method.

Table A.1
National Population Data and the Realized Sample

	National Population Percentage and Target Sample	Realized Sample (unweighted)	Realized Sample (weighted by province)
Gender			
Male	49.3%	50.7%	50.4%
Female	50.7%	49.3%	49.6%
Age			
18–24	26.4%	26.0%	25.7%
25–34	26.8%	29.1%	29.0%
35–44	18.9%	22.2%	22.3%
45–54	13.2%	13.4%	13.5%
55 and up	14.7%	9.3%	9.4%
Geographic code			
Urban ^a	66.3%	72.3%	72.5%
Rural ^b	33.7%	27.7%	27.5%

¹ Central Intelligence Agency, 2008.

² Statistics Center of Iran, no date available.

³ Central Intelligence Agency, 2008.

Table A.1—Continued

	National Population Percentage and Target Sample	Realized Sample (unweighted)	Realized Sample (weighted by province)
Province/city/region			
Arbadil	1.7%	2.4%	1.7%
Azerbaijan-e Gharbi	4.1%	4.4%	4.1%
Azerbaijan-e Sharqi	5.1%	5.4%	5.1%
Bushehr	1.3%	1.3%	1.3%
Chaharmahal va Bakhtiari	1.2%	0.9%	1.2%
Esfahan	6.5%	7.4%	6.5%
Fars	6.2%	6.4%	6.2%
Gilan	3.4%	1.9%	3.4%
Hamadan	2.4%	2.4%	2.4%
Hormozgan	2.0%	2.4%	2.0%
Ilam	0.8%	0.8%	0.8%
Kerman	3.8%	4.4%	3.8%
Kermanshah	2.7%	3.4%	2.7%
Khorasan-e Jonubi (South)	0.9%	0.9%	0.9%
Khuzestan	6.1%	6.4%	6.1%
Kohgiluyeh va Boyerahmad	0.9%	0.9%	0.9%
Kordestan	2.0%	1.9%	2.0%
Lorestan	2.4%	2.4%	2.4%
Markazi	1.9%	1.5%	1.9%
Mazandaran	4.1%	2.9%	4.1%
Semnan	0.8%	0.8%	0.8%
Sistan va Baluchestan	3.4%	3.4%	3.4%
Tehran	19.0%	19.5%	19.0%
Yazd	1.4%	1.4%	1.4%
Zanjan	1.4%	1.5%	1.4%
Qazvin	1.6%	1.6%	1.6%
Qom	1.5%	1.5%	1.5%
Golestan	2.3%	2.3%	2.3%
Khorasan-e Razavi	7.9%	6.4%	7.9%
Khorasan-e Shomali (North)	1.2%	1.4%	1.2%

SOURCE: The Statistics Center of Iran, no date available.

^a *Urban* includes both major metropolitan areas and other urban areas.

^b *Rural* includes both towns and villages.

Each designated respondent was called up to three times for an interview. These calls were made either at different times on the same day or on different days during the field period. Callbacks were made for a total of 277 respondents, of which 223 were interviewed and 54 were not interviewed after callbacks. As such, a total of 1,002 interviews were conducted according to the following breakdown:

- interview completed during the first call: 77.7 percent
- interview completed during the second call: 8.7 percent
- interview completed during the third or subsequent call: 13.6 percent.

Callbacks were managed using the CATI/Virtual Call Center (VCC) special software module.

During the fieldwork, KARL supervisors monitored the number of respondents interviewed to ensure proportionate representation in terms of province, exchange, and gender. If an interviewer could not speak to an eligible person after three callbacks, or if the person reached was not an Iranian national, then the interviewer moved to the next telephone number generated by the CATI system.

Survey Management and Interviewing

KARL managers supervised all aspects of data collection and conducted comprehensive training sessions with the field operations team. The field team consisted of 20 interviewers, 17 male and three female, with varying degrees of education (ranging from high school to college). All interviewers were native Farsi-language speakers. Field interviewers received training on the objectives of the program, survey details, selecting respondents, the questionnaire (i.e., asking questions and recording responses), timing and control issues, and usage and applications of the CATI system.

Quality-control procedures were carried out on 100 percent of the interviews and were applied in three stages:

- Procedure One: The CATI system ensured that questions were asked in the correct order, including skip patterns.
- Procedure Two: Within their in-house facility, the KARL supervisors observed the entire field process and all interviewers, ensuring correct application of fieldwork rules, administration of contact information, questionnaire application, and conversation quality.
- Procedure Three: For telephone surveys, KARL used a training-and-observation procedure called *Live Field Observation*, which is similar to the procedure used in face-to-face survey countries. Specifically, KARL applied this procedure using the KARL Integrated Multi-Language Telephone Interviewing Control System. This system has the following elements and functional benefits:
 - *Microsoft Net Framework*. This facilitates communication between each interviewing unit and the supervising console, using, for example, instant messaging between terminals. The supervisor can send messages to an interviewer's screen if there is a problem.
 - *Ericsson Silent Intrusion System*. This enables a supervisor to listen to an interviewer and respondent at the same time without disturbing the interview. The supervisor can

- interrupt the interview, if necessary, and give instructions to the interviewer without disturbing the respondent.
- *VoxCo CATI Field Monitoring System*. This enables the supervisor to observe an interviewer's coding and recording process from the supervisor's own computer.

All live-observation supervisors had the technical abilities needed to run the systems just described, and all had almost seven years of field experience with telephone surveys in Iran. Using these systems, the supervisors could observe the full process and give instructions to interviewers.

The Results of Back-Check Controls

In the course of fielding the survey, no interviews were rejected, no interviewers were terminated, and no supervisors were terminated. In terms of political, social, or newsworthy events that might have affected the survey, we note that a number of dissidents were arrested in Iran, and at least nine were killed during violent clashes between security forces and protesters. There were frequent line-cuts due to technical problems with the Iranian telephone lines.

Field Results

As shown in Table A.2, a total of 2,987 households were selected for screening to determine whether an eligible adult was present. Of these, 1,598 were successfully screened; 1,554 were determined to include an eligible adult; and 1,002 resulted in an interview. Using the American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) formulas for calculating response rates, this results in a cooperation rate of 65 percent and a response rate (RR) 3 of 61 percent,⁴ taking into account the fraction of cases with unknown eligibility that, based on the results of the cases that were successfully screened, were likely eligible.

Approximately 65 percent of Iranians telephoned actually participated in the survey. Unfortunately, no demographic information was available regarding those who did not participate. As a result, all survey results are based on the dataset alone. Therefore, one must keep in mind that the findings represent the attitudes of 65 percent of Iranian households with landline telephones in which someone spoke Farsi and would have participated in the survey. Because the landline phones are estimated to be in 80 percent of Iranian households,⁵ the survey results generalize to 52 percent of Iranian households. Several possibilities for broadening the sample are discussed in Chapter Six.

Table A.3 shows the survey response rate. Table A.4 shows the calculation of the AAPOR RRs 1 and 3.

⁴ The response rate, as defined by the Council of American Survey Research Organizations (Frankel, 1983) and other sources, is the number of complete interviews with reporting units divided by the number of eligible reporting units in the sample. AAPOR has developed a standard set of ratios for calculating response rates. RR3 estimates what proportion of cases of unknown eligibility is actually eligible. Specifically, RR3 is the number of complete interviews / [(the number of complete interviews + the number of partial interviews) plus (the number of refusals and breakoffs + the number of noncontacts + the number of "other" cases) plus the estimated proportion of cases of unknown eligibility that are eligible multiplied by (the number of cases of unknown eligibility, including cases where it is unknown if the case is a housing unit plus other unknown cases)]. For further information, see American Association for Public Opinion Research, 2009.

⁵ Kantar Media Research Group, 2007.

Table A.2
Completed Interviews, Refusals, and Noncontacts

Result Category	Number	Percentage
Noncontact		
Nonresidential building	1,312	94.5
Not able to enter residential building	N/A	N/A
No one at home after three visits	77	5.5
Designated respondent is in a long-term absence	N/A	N/A
Subtotal	1,389	100.0
Respondent not eligible (not Iranian)	44	100.0
Refusals		
Outright refusal at the door	N/A	N/A
Outright refusal by the respondent	250	45.3
Interview terminated by the respondent	296	53.6
Respondent never available for an appointment	6	N/A
Subtotal	552	100.0
Completed interviews	1,002	100.0
Total contact attempts	2,987	100.0

Table A.3
Response Rate

	Number	Percentage
Total refusals	546	35.3
Total completed interviews	1,002	64.7
Total successful contacts	1,548	100.0

Table A.4
Calculation of AAPOR Ratios

	Calculation	Percentage
Value of e	No. of Households with an Eligible Adult/No. of Households Where Eligibility Was Determined or Eligible/[Not Eligible + Eligible] or $1,554/[1,312 + 44 + 1,554]$	53
Cooperation rate	Completes/Eligible Adults Selected for Interview or $I/[(I + P) + R]$ or $1,002/[(1,002 + 296) + 250]$	65
RR1	Completes/[Interviews + Noninterviews + Unknown Eligibility] or $I/[(I + P) + (R + NC + O) + (UH + UO)]$ or $1,002/[1,002 + 296 + (250 + 6 + 44) + (77)]$	60
RR3	Completes/Known Eligibles + (e × No. of Households with Unknown Eligibility) or $I/[(I + P) + (R + NC + O) + e(UH + UO)]$ or $[(1,002 + 296) + (250 + 6 + 44) + 0.534(77)]$	61

NOTES: I = the number of complete interviews. NC = the number of noncontacts. O = the number of other cases. P = the number of partial interviews. R = the number of refusals and breakoffs. UH = the number of cases of unknown eligibility (unknown whether a housing unit). UO = the number of other cases of unknown eligibility.

Explanations for Refusals and Interview Terminations

The most common reasons given for refusing to participate were that the respondent refuses to participate in surveys in general (N = 253), personal reasons (N = 112), the survey content (N = 112), and the timing of the survey (N = 24). Most terminations occurred at question Q-2 (concerning the current economic situation in Iran), at question Q-4 (concerning the respondent's personal economic situation), or at question Q-5 (concerning the ideal role of government in managing the economy).

Weighting the Data by Province

Because the demographic characteristics of the sample differed from those of the population in general as described by the Statistical Center of Iran's 2005 data, a set of weights were calculated based on each province's population. These weights are provided in Table A.5. Throughout the entire survey, the unweighted results were nearly identical to the weighted results. Therefore, only the weighted results are presented in this report.

Table A.5
Weighting Factors, by Province

Province	Population Distribution	Sample Distribution	Weighting Factor
Ardabil	1.7%	2.4%	0.72736
Azerbaijani-e Gharbi	4.1%	4.4%	0.92824
Azerbaijani-e Sharqi	5.1%	5.4%	0.94849
Bushehr	1.3%	1.3%	0.96901
Chaharmahal va Bakhtiari	1.2%	0.9%	1.35489
Esfahan	6.5%	7.4%	0.87573
Fars	6.2%	6.4%	0.96317
Gilan	3.4%	1.9%	1.79905
Hamadan	2.4%	2.4%	1.00874
Hormozgan	2.0%	2.4%	0.83131
Ilam	0.8%	0.8%	0.96970
Kerman	3.8%	4.4%	0.85683
Kermanshah	2.7%	3.4%	0.78568
Khorasan-e Jonubi (South)	0.9%	0.9%	1.00510
Khuzestan	6.1%	6.4%	0.94942
Kohgiluyeh va Boyerahmad	0.9%	0.9%	1.00175
Kordestan	2.0%	1.9%	1.07736
Lorestan	2.4%	2.4%	1.01659
Markazi	1.9%	1.5%	1.28042

Table A.5—Continued

Province	Population Distribution	Sample Distribution	Weighting Factor
Mazandaran	4.1%	2.9%	1.43236
Semnan	0.8%	0.8%	1.04780
Sistan va Baluchestan	3.4%	3.4%	1.00572
Tehran	19.0%	19.5%	0.97836
Yazd	1.4%	1.4%	1.00594
Zanjan	1.4%	1.5%	0.91403
Qazvin	1.6%	1.6%	1.01557
Qom	1.5%	1.5%	0.99187
Golestan	2.3%	2.3%	0.99934
Khorasan-e Rezavi	7.9%	6.4%	1.24216
Khorasan-e Shomali (North)	1.2%	1.4%	0.82396
Total	100.0%	100.0%	N/A

NOTE: Percentages do not sum to 100 due to rounding.

Additional Sample Characteristics

There were a total of 1,002 completed surveys. Tables A.6–A.9 show demographic characteristics of the sample.

**Table A.6
Educational Achievement**

	Frequency	Percentage
Illiterate	26	2.6
No formal education but can read and write	5	0.5
Finished some elementary school	113	11.3
Finished some intermediate school	111	11.1
Some secondary school	39	3.9
Finished secondary school	388	38.7
Finished some college	104	10.4
Finished college	216	21.5

NOTE: Percentages do not sum to 100 due to rounding.

Table A.7
Class

	Frequency	Percentage
Upper	24	2.4
Middle	493	49.2
Working	185	18.4
Poor	289	28.8
Refused	6	0.6
Don't know	5	0.5

NOTE: Percentages do not sum to 100 due to rounding.

Table A.8
Ethnicity

	Frequency	Percentage
Persian	528	52.6
Azeri	203	20.2
Gilaki & Mazanderani	55	5.5
Kurd	83	8.3
Arab	16	1.6
Lur	56	5.6
Baloch	9	0.9
Turkmen	11	1.1
Other	31	3.1
Refused	6	0.6
Don't know	4	0.4

NOTE: Percentages do not sum to 100 due to rounding.

Table A.9
Job Status

	Frequency	Percentage
Working full time (≥ 40 hours)	278	27.7
Working part time (< 40 hours)	89	8.9
Unemployed, looking for work	46	4.6
Unemployed, not looking for work	24	2.4
Housewife (not working outside the home)	308	30.7
Student/apprentice	184	18.3
Retired/disabled	69	6.9
Other	1	0.1
Don't know	3	0.3

NOTE: Percentages do not sum to 100 due to rounding.

Introductory Script and Oral Consent—English

Hello. My name is . . . , an interviewer from KA Research Limited, Turkey. I am conducting a survey on Iranian attitudes regarding international relations and related issues, such as the Iranian economy and domestic politics. I would like to talk with someone in the household who is at least 18 years old and has had the most recent birthday. Is that person available so that I may tell him or her about this study?

The survey is being conducted by KA Research Limited, a regional research and consulting company based in Turkey that surveys the Middle East and North African countries. My colleagues and I will be asking 1,000 people like you to participate. Like the rest of the participants, we have selected your household at random.

If you choose to participate, the interview will take about 15 minutes. Taking part in this interview is voluntary. You should feel free to raise any questions or concerns at any point in time during this interview. There is no “right” or “wrong” answer. You are free to skip any questions that you prefer not to address. At any time during the discussion, you are free to decide to no longer participate: Simply indicate that you no longer wish to continue, and I will hang up.

None of the participants in the survey, including you, will ever be identified. The survey is completely confidential. Your phone number was randomly selected by a computer and is not available to me or to KA Research Limited. We do not have any identifying information about you at all.

If you have any questions about this study following our interview today, you are welcome to contact the supervisor for this project, XXX [This individual is designated by KA Research Limited. The individual is a member of the Iranian management team and thus fluent in Farsi.], by phone (XXX).

Do you agree to participate in this survey?

1. Yes—Continue
2. No—Thank the respondent, hang up, and call the next household

[If yes] Are you ready to get started?

1. Yes—Continue
2. No—Give time to the respondent, if necessary, to make appointment

Survey Questionnaire—English

RIS Telephone Survey Wave 1, October–November 2009

Survey Management Information

M-1. Respondent identification number (1–4)

M-2. Card number 1 (5)

M-3. Wave number 01 (6–7)

M-4. Sampling-point number (8–13)

M-5. Urbanization (14)

- Major metros
- Other urban
- Towns
- Villages

M-6. Province (15–16)

1. Ardabil
2. Azerbaijan-e Gharbi
3. Azerbaijan-e Sharqi
4. Bushehr
5. Chaharmahal va Bakhtiari
6. Esfahan
7. Fars
8. Gilan
9. Hamadan
10. Hormozgan
11. Ilam
12. Kerman
13. Kermanshah
14. Khorasan-e Jonubi (South)
15. Khuzestan
16. Kohgiluyeh va Boyerahmad
17. Kordestan
18. Lorestan
19. Markazi
20. Mazandaran

21. Semnan
22. Sistan va Baluchestan
23. Tehran
24. Yazd
25. Zanzan
26. Qazvin
27. Qom
28. Golestan
29. Khorasan-e Razavi
30. Khorasan-e Shomali (North)

M-7. Year of interview: XXX (17–20)

M-8. Month of interview (21–22)

1. January
2. February
3. March
4. April
5. May
6. June
7. July
8. August
9. September
10. October
11. November
12. December

M-9. Date of interview: XXX (23–24)

M-10. Day of interview (25)

1. Friday
2. Saturday
3. Sunday
4. Monday
5. Tuesday
6. Wednesday
7. Thursday

M-11. Interviewer code: XXX (26–29)

M-12. Interview completed on the . . . (30)

1. First call?
2. Second call?
3. Third call?

M-13. Supervisor code: XXX (31–32)

M-14. Record time (using 24-hour clock) interview began: XXX (33–36) (Record time began starting with Q-1)

M-15. Record time (using 24-hour clock) interview ended: XXX (37–40) (Fill in all four data

positions)

M-16. Record length of interview in minutes: XXX (41–42)

M-17. Date formatted field: OCT 2009 (43–50)

M-18. Keypuncher code (51–52)

M-19. Oral consent received (53)

1. Yes
2. No

Q-1. In general, do you think that the country is going in the right direction, or do you think it is going in the wrong direction?

1. The country is going in the right direction
2. The country is going in the wrong direction

-
7. Neither right nor wrong direction (vol.)
 8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't know (vol.) (61)

Q-2. How do you rate the current economic situation in Iran?

1. Excellent
2. Very good
3. Average
4. Somewhat poor
5. Poor

-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't know (vol.) (62)

Q-3. How do you rate your own personal economic situation?

1. Excellent
2. Very good
3. Average
4. Somewhat poor
5. Poor

-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't know (vol.) (63)

Q-4. Do you think that your personal economic situation will be better or worse in a year?

1. It will be much better
2. It will be somewhat better
3. It will stay the same
4. It will be somewhat worse
5. It will be much worse

-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't know (vol.) (64)

Q-5. What is the ideal role of the government in managing the economy?

1. Creation of jobs
2. Wealth redistribution
3. Providing subsidies
4. Attracting foreign investment

97. Other (please specify: XXX)

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't know (vol.) (65–66)

Q-6. In your opinion, which country is pursuing the best economic model for Iran to follow?
(Open-ended, record one response)

1. China
2. The United States
3. The United Arab Emirates
4. Germany

97. Other (please specify: XXX)

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't know (vol.) (67–68)

Q-7. As you may know, some economic sanctions have been imposed on Iran. Have the international sanctions affected the Iranian economy very positively, somewhat positively, neither positively nor negatively, somewhat negatively, or very negatively?

1. Very positively
2. Somewhat positively
3. Neither positively nor negatively
4. Somewhat negatively
5. Very negatively

8. Refused (vol.)

9. Don't know (vol.) (69)

Interviewer read out: Now I would like to ask you some questions about Iran and its foreign relations.

Q-8. What thoughts come to mind when you reflect on the possibility of reestablishing relations with the United States? (Open-ended, record one response) (Vendor to add codes as needed)

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't know (vol.) (70–71)

Q-9. Are you very in favor, somewhat in favor, neither in favor nor opposed, somewhat opposed, or very opposed to reestablishing relations with the United States?

1. Very in favor
2. Somewhat in favor
3. Neither in favor nor opposed

3. Somewhat opposed

4. Very opposed

8. Refused (vol.)

9. Don't know (vol.) (72)

Q-10. How important is the issue of reestablishing relations with the United States to you personally?

1. Extremely important

2. Very important

3. Somewhat important

4. Not important at all

8. Refused (vol.)

9. Don't know (vol.) (73)

Q-11. What thoughts come to mind when you reflect on the history of Iranian-U.S. relations? (Open-ended, record one response) (Vendor to add codes as needed)

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't know (vol.) (74–75)

Q-12. With the election of Barack Obama as U.S. President, are Iran's relations with the United States likely to get much better, somewhat better, likely to stay the same, get somewhat worse, or get much worse?

1. Likely to get much better

2. Likely to get somewhat better

3. Likely to stay the same

4. Likely to get somewhat worse

5. Likely to get much worse

8. Refused (vol.)

9. Don't know (vol.) (76)

Q-13. If U.S.-Iranian relations are reestablished, do you support the establishment of a U.S. Interest Section OR a U.S. Embassy in Iran?

1. Interest Section

2. Embassy

8. Refused (vol.)

9. Don't know (vol.) (77)

Q-14. What specific steps would the United States need to take in order to show more respect for Iran? (Open-ended, record one response) (Vendor to add codes as needed)

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't know (vol.) (78–79)

Q-15. If the United States opens a direct dialogue with Iran, would it indicate a position of great strength, some strength, neither strength nor weakness, some weakness, or great weakness on the part of the United States?

1. Great strength
2. Some strength
3. Neither strength nor weakness
4. Some weakness
5. Great weakness

-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't know (vol.) (80)

Q-16. If Iran opens a direct dialogue with the United States, would it indicate a position of great strength, some strength, neither strength nor weakness, some weakness, or great weakness on the part of Iran?

1. Great strength
2. Some strength
3. Neither strength nor weakness
4. Some weakness
5. Great weakness

-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't know (vol.) (81)

Q-17. In a recent speech, U.S. President Obama acknowledged that the United States played a role in the 1953 overthrow of the democratically-elected Prime Minister Mossadegh. What thoughts come to mind in response to President Obama's acknowledgement? (Open-ended, record one response) (Vendor to add codes as needed)

-
98. Refused (vol.)
 99. Don't know (vol.) (82–83)

Q-18. Thinking about Iran's economy, trade relations now exist with only some countries. Do you strongly favor, somewhat favor, neither favor nor oppose, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose having normal trade relations with the United States?

1. Strongly favor
2. Somewhat favor
3. Neither favor nor oppose
4. Somewhat oppose
5. Strongly oppose

-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't know (vol.) (84)

Q-19. When you reflect on Iran's standing in the international community, do you feel that Iran tends to stand alone, is somewhat integrated, is well integrated, or is completely integrated into the international community?

1. Stands alone

2. Is somewhat integrated
3. Is well integrated
4. Is completely integrated

-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't know (vol.) (85)

Q-20a–e. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, neither favorable nor unfavorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of the following: (Randomly rotate a–e)

	Very Favorable	Somewhat Favorable	Neither Favorable Nor Unfa- vorable	Somewhat Unfavor- able	Very Unfavor- able	Refused (vol.)	Don't Know (vol.)	Data	Order Read (91)
a. The current U.S. govern- ment	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	86	1
b. The American people	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	87	2
c. U.S. policies toward Iran	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	88	3
d. Barack Obama	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	89	4
e. American cultural influ- ences within Iran	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	90	5

Q-21a–e. I would like to ask you some questions about events that have taken place. I want you to tell me what types of attitudes, if any, do they call to mind toward the United States. Do you have very positive, somewhat positive, no attitudes, somewhat negative, or very negative attitudes toward the United States in relation to: (Randomly rotate a–e)

	Very Positive	Somewhat Positive	No Attitudes	Somewhat Negative	Very Negative	Refused (vol.)	Don't Know (vol.)	Data	Order Read (97)
a. The U.S. response to the recent presidential elections in Iran	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	92	1
b. The U.S. role in the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	93	2
c. Barack Obama's policies regarding reestablishment of U.S.-Iranian relations	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	94	3
d. The U.S. position during the Iran-Iraq War	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	95	4
e. The U.S. role in the 1953 coup in Iran	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	96	5

Q-22a–e. I would like to ask you some questions about how you have learned about events that have taken place. Please tell me if you have learned the most about these events from firsthand experience, educational sources such as courses or books, family members, friends, Iranian government media, or nongovernment media. (Randomly rotate a–e)

	Firsthand Experi- ence	Educational Sources	Family Member	Friends	Iranian Govern- ment Media	Nongov- ernment Media	Refused (vol.)	Don't Know (vol.)	Data	Order Read (97)
a. The U.S. response to the recent presidential elections in Iran	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9	98	1
b. The U.S. role in the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9	99	2
c. Barack Obama's policies regarding re-establishment of U.S.-Iranian relations	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9	100	3
d. The U.S. position during the Iran-Iraq War	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9	101	4
e. The U.S. role in the 1953 coup in Iran	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9	102	5

Interviewer read out: Now I would like to ask you some questions about nuclear issues in Iran.

Q-23. Do you strongly favor, somewhat favor, neither favor nor oppose, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose the Islamic Republic of Iran developing nuclear energy for civilian use?

1. Strongly favor
2. Somewhat favor
3. Neither favor nor oppose
4. Somewhat oppose
5. Strongly oppose

-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't know (vol.) (104)

Q-24. Apart from nuclear energy, would you strongly favor, somewhat favor, neither favor nor oppose, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose the Islamic Republic of Iran developing nuclear weapons?

1. Strongly favor
2. Somewhat favor
3. Neither favor nor oppose
4. Somewhat oppose
5. Strongly oppose

-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't know (vol.) (105)

Q-25. Some people feel that possession of nuclear energy is a national right, while others feel that it is not. Which comes closer to your point of view?

1. Possession of nuclear technology is a national right
2. Possession of nuclear technology is not a national right

-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't know (vol.) (106)

Q-26. Apart from nuclear energy, some people feel that possession of nuclear weapons is a national right, while others do not. Which comes closer to your point of view?

1. Possession of nuclear weapons is a national right
2. Possession of nuclear weapons is not a national right

-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't know (vol.) (107)

Q-27. Did you vote in the June 2009 presidential election in Iran?

1. Yes
2. No

-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't know (vol.) (108)

Q-28. [If respondent answers 1 in Q-27] What issue was most important to you as you voted?
(Open-ended, record one response)

1. The economy
 2. U.S.-Iranian relations
 3. Social/religious issues
 4. The nuclear program
- (Vendor to add codes as needed)

-
96. Not asked
 97. Other (please specify: XXX)
 98. Refused (vol.)
 99. Don't know (vol.) (109–110)

Q-29. Do you feel that Iran and the United States have mostly converging interests, mostly diverging interests, or a roughly equal mix of both?

1. Mostly converging interests [Ask Q-30]
2. Mostly diverging interests [Ask Q-31]
3. A roughly equal mix of both [Ask both Q-30 and Q-31]

-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't know (vol.) (111)

Q-30. [If respondent answers 1 or 3 in Q-29] On which issue do you see the most convergence of interests? (Open-ended, record one response)

1. Iraq
 2. Afghanistan
 3. Al-Qaeda
 4. Persian Gulf security
 5. Energy cooperation
 6. Business cooperation
 7. Israeli-Palestinian conflict
- (Vendor to add codes as needed)

-
96. Not asked
 97. Other (please specify: XXX)
 98. Refused (vol.)
 99. Don't know (vol.) (112-113)

Q-31. [If respondent answers 2 or 3 in Q-29] On which issue do you see the most divergence of interests? (Open-ended, record one response)

1. Iraq
2. Afghanistan
3. Al-Qaeda
4. Persian Gulf security
5. Energy cooperation
6. Business cooperation
7. Israeli-Palestinian conflict

(Vendor to add codes as needed)

-
- 96. Not asked
 - 97. Other (please specify: XXX)
 - 98. Refused (vol.)
 - 99. Don't know (vol.) (114–115)

Demographics

Interviewer read out: Thank you for your time, I just have a few last questions to ask and then we are finished.

(Ask all)

D-1. Gender

- 1. Male
- 2. Female (131)

D-2. Actual age: XXX (132–133)

D-3. What is your job status? Are you

- 1. Working full time (40 or more hours)
- 2. Working part time (less than 40 hours)
- 3. Unemployed, looking for work
- 4. Unemployed, not looking for work
- 5. Housewife (not working outside the home)
- 6. Student/apprentice
- 7. Retired/disabled

-
- 97. Other (vol.)
 - 98. Refused (vol.)
 - 99. Don't know (134–135)

D-4. (Ask those who are working full or part time in D-3): Are you

- 1. Self-employed
- 2. Do you for work for a state company
- 3. Foundation
- 4. Private firm or factory with ten or fewer employees
- 5. Private firm or factory with ten or more employees¹

-
- 96. Not asked
 - 97. Other (vol.)
 - 98. Refused (vol.)
 - 99. Don't know (136–137)

D-5. (Ask those who are working full or part time in D-3) What is your primary occupation?

- 1. Owner of own large business

¹ Late in the process, we noticed the overlap between items 4 and 5. However, this overlap does not affect the results because we did not use this variable in our analyses.

2. Manager of enterprise
3. Manager of division or department
4. Professional
5. White-collar worker/officer employee
6. Clerical-level office worker
7. Foreman, technician
8. Skilled worker
9. Semiskilled worker
10. Unskilled worker
11. Military (officer)
12. Military (nonofficer)
13. Civil servant (police, teacher, etc.)
14. Farmer, fisherman
15. Landless agricultural laborer
16. Owner of small business/shopkeeper

-
96. Not asked
 98. Refused
 99. Don't know (138-139)

D-6a. (Ask all) How many years of formal education have you completed? (Record actual years): XXX (140–141)

D-6b. (Ask all) Educational achievement

1. Illiterate
2. No formal education but read and write
3. Some/finished elementary school
4. Some/finished intermediate school
5. Some secondary school
6. Finished secondary school
7. Some finished/college
8. Finished university (142)

D-7. What is your religious affiliation? (Open-ended with precodes)

1. Shi'a Muslim
2. Sunni Muslim
3. Muslim

-
7. Other
 8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't know (143)

D-8. (Ask all) What is your household's total monthly income from all sources, that is all types of income for all persons living at this address? Is it (Read list)

1. 100,000 tomans or less
2. 100,001 to 150,000 tomans
3. 150,001 to 200,000 tomans
4. 200,001 to 400,000 tomans

5. 400,001 to 600,000 tomans
6. 600,001 to 800,000 tomans
7. 800,001 Tomans or more?

-
8. Refused (vol.)
 9. Don't know (144)

D-9. Would you describe your household as upper class, middle class, working class, or poor?

1. Upper (A/B)
2. Middle (C1, C2)
3. Working (D)
4. Poor (E)

-
8. Refused
 9. Don't know (145)

D-10. What is your ethnic origin?

1. Persian
2. Azeri
3. Gilaki & Mazanderani
4. Kurd
5. Arab
6. Lur
7. Baloch
8. Turkmen

-
97. Other (please specify: XXX)
 98. Refused
 99. Don't know (146–147)

D-11. Can you tell me the languages that you speak well enough to understand a radio or television newscast in that language? [Open-ended, multiple response, do not read categories]

	Yes	Not Mentioned	Refused (vol.)	Don't Know (vol.)	Data
a. Persian/Farsi	1	2	8	9	148
b. Azeri	1	2	8	9	149
c. Kurdish	1	2	8	9	150
d. Arabic	1	2	8	9	151
e. Turkish	1	2	8	9	152
f. Dari	1	2	8	9	153
g. English	1	2	8	9	154
h. French	1	2	8	9	155
i. German	1	2	8	9	156
j. Other	1	2	8	9	157

D-12. Would you be willing to participate in another of our surveys later in the year?

1. Yes
2. No (158)

Please record time (using 24-hour clock) interview was completed.

Read closing statement to the respondent: “Thank you for participating in our survey. Do you have any questions? In the next few days my supervisor may contact you to evaluate the quality of my work and answer any other questions you may have.”

D-13. Interviewer: Which of the following statements do you think best describes the level of comprehension of the survey questionnaire by the respondent?

1. The respondent understood all of the questions
2. The respondent understood most of the questions
3. The respondent understood most of the questions but with some help
4. The respondent had difficulty understanding most of the questions, even with help from me (159)

D-14. Interviewer: Which of the following statements best describes the level of comfort or unease that the respondent had with the survey questionnaire?

1. The respondent was comfortable (at ease) with the entire questionnaire
2. The respondent was comfortable with most of the questions
3. The respondent was comfortable with only some of the questions
4. The respondent was generally uncomfortable with the survey questionnaire (160)

D-15. (Interviewer code): Please indicate which, if any, of the following types of questions caused this respondent any uneasiness or decreased cooperation during the interview. (Open-ended, write in)

- a. First mention: XXX (161–162)
- b. Second mention: XXX (163–164)
- c. Third mention: XXX (165–166)

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't know (vol.)

D-16. Was the respondent candid in giving his or her answers?

1. Yes
2. No (167)

To be completed by the supervisor:

D-17. Was the interview subject to quality control/back-check?

1. Yes
2. No (168)

D-18. Method of quality control/back-check

1. Direct supervision during interview
2. Back-check by calling home again
3. Not applicable (169)

Introductory Script and Oral Consent—Farsi

The Farsi-language introductory script and oral consent are supplied on the next page.

نظر سنجی عمومی مردم ایران (فرم شماره 1)

معرفی

سلام. من..... کارمند مصاحبه کننده از طرف شرکت تحقیقاتی "کا" در کشور ترکیه هستم و در حال حاضر نظرسنجی را در مورد گرایشهای مردم ایران نسبت به ارتباطات بین المللی و مسائل مربوط به آن مانند وضعیت اقتصادی ایران و سیاست داخلی این کشور انجام میدهم. مایل هستم تا با کسی از افراد خانه تان صحبت کنم که حد اقل 18 سال داشته باشد و آخرین سالگرد تولدش هم در همین اواخر بوده. آیا فردی با چنین ویژگی وجود دارد تا بتوانم با ایشان راجع به این طرح تحقیقاتی حرف بزنم؟

این نظرسنجی از طرف شرکت "کا" مدیریت و اجرا میگردد. "کا" یک شرکت تحقیقاتی و مشاوره ای منطقه ای هست که در کشور ترکیه واقع شده و همواره بر روی پروژه های تحقیقاتی در خاورمیانه و شمال آفریقا کار میکند. در این پروژه من و همکارانم از حدود 1000 نفر که همه افرادی مثل خود شما هستند درخواست میکنیم تا در نظرسنجی اشتراک کنند. همچنین مثل بقیه شرکت کنندگان در این مصاحبه، شماره شما را هم به طور اتفاقی دایر نموده ایم.

اگر شما تصمیم بگیرید تا در این مصاحبه اشتراک نمایید، حدود 15 دقیقه از زمان شما را خواهیم گرفت. قابل ذکر است که شرکت در این مصاحبه کاملاً اختیاری بوده و در هر جای از مصاحبه اگر سوالی یا موردی پیش آمد، میتوانید کاملاً آزادانه مطرح کنید. در جواب سوالات چیزی به اسم "درست" یا "غلط" وجود ندارد. شما کاملاً مختار هستید تا هر سوالی را که دوست ندارید، بی پاسخ رها نمایید و در جریان مصاحبه هر وقت که خواستید میتوانید از ادامه نظرسنجی صرف نظر کنید. در صورت بروز چنین موردی به سادگی میتوانید بگویید که مایل به ادامه دادن نیستید و من هم گوشی را قطع خواهم کرد.

قابل یادآوری است که نه شما و نه هیچ یک از افرادی که در این مصاحبه اشتراک میکنند شناسایی نخواهند شد. نظرسنجی کاملاً محرمانه هست. شماره تلفن شما به طور اتفاقی توسط کامپیوتر گرفته شده، نه من و نه شرکت "کا" هیچکدام شماره شما را نمیدانیم. ما هیچ اطلاعاتی راجع به هویت شما در دست نداریم.

در صورت بوجود آمدن هر گونه سوالی راجع به نظر سنجی امروز، بسیار خوشحال میشویم که با شماره تماس گرفته و نظرات خود را با ناظر (سوپروایزر) این پروژه..... {فرد ناظر توسط شرکت "کا" تأیید خواهد شد. این فرد یکی از اعضای ایرانی تیم مدیریت و نیز مسلط به زبان فارسی خواهد بود} در میان بگذارید.

آیا مایل به اشتراک در این مصاحبه هستید ؟

1. بله----- ادامه
2. نخیر----- از پاسخگو تشکر نموده، تلفن را قطع کرده و با شماره بعدی تماس بگیرید.

[در صورتی که جواب بله باشد] آیا آماده شروع هستید؟

1. بله----- ادامه
2. نخیر----- به پاسخگو وقت بدهید و در صورت نیاز برای بعد قرار بگذارید.

Survey Questionnaire—Farsi

The Farsi-language survey questionnaire is supplied on the pages that follow.

ایران: پرسشنامه تلفنی

(اکتبر/نوامبر 2009)

اطلاعات مدیریت پرسشنامه

1-M شماره شناسایی پاسخگو (1-4):

2-M شماره کارت 1 (5):

3-M شماره موج 01 (6-7):

4-M منطقه نمونه گیری (کد منطقه + شماره)...../.....(8-13)

5-M شهر نشینی: (14)

1- شهرهای اصلی

2- سایر شهرنشینها

3- شهرستانها (شهر کوچک)

4- روستا

6-M استان(15-16):

1. اردبیل	11. ایلام	21. سمنان
2. آذربایجان غربی	12. کرمان	22. سیستان و بلوچستان
3. آذربایجان شرقی	13. کرمانشاهان	23. تهران
4. بوشهر	14. خراسان	24. یزد
5. چهارمحال بختیاری	15. خوزستان	25. زنجان
6. اصفهان	16. کهگیلویه و بویراحمدی	26. قزوین
7. فارس	17. کردستان	27. قم
8. گیلان	18. لرستان	28. گلستان
9. همدان	19. مرکزی	29. خراسان رضوی
10. هرمزگان	20. مازندران	30. خراسان شمالی

7-M سال مصاحبه _____ (17-20)

8-M ماه مصاحبه:

1. ژانویه	4. آوریل	7. ژوئیه	10- اکتبر
2. فوریه	5. مه	8- اگوست	11 - نوامبر
3. مارس	6- ژوئن	9- سپتامبر	12- دسامبر

9-M تاریخ مصاحبه: _____ (23-24)

10-M روز مصاحبه:(25)

- | | | |
|-----------|-------------|------------|
| 1. جمعه | 4. دوشنبه | 7. پنجشنبه |
| 2. شنبه | 5. سه شنبه | |
| 3. یکشنبه | 6. چهارشنبه | |

11-M کد مصاحبه کننده: _____. (29-26)

12-M مصاحبه در تماس به اتمام رسید. (30)

- | |
|--------------|
| 1. تماس اول؟ |
| 2. تماس دوم؟ |
| 3. تماس سوم؟ |

13-M کد ناظر: _____. (32-31)

14-M شروع مصاحبه (با استفاده از فرمت 24 ساعته) _____. (29-26)
(زمان ثبت با سوال اول شروع میگردد)

15-M پایان مصاحبه (با استفاده از فرمت 24 ساعته) _____. (29-26)
(هر 4 خانه در نظر گرفته شده برای جواب را پر کنید)

16-M طول زمانی مصاحبه به دقیقه: _____. (42-41)

17-M فرمت در نظر گرفته شده برای تاریخ: **OCT 2009** (50-43)

18-M کد ماشین نویسی: _____. (52-51)

19-M پاسخگر شفاهن قبول کرد مصاحبه بشود (54)

1. بله

2. خیر

ستونهای 54-60 به طور عمدی خالی گذاشته شده.

س-1 : به طور عمومی، به نظر شما آیا اوضاع مملکت حرکت مثبت دارد یا اینکه در جهت منفی در حرکت است؟

1. اوضاع کشور در جهت مثبت در حرکت است.
2. اوضاع کشور در جهت منفی در حرکت است.

7. نه در جهت مثبت و نه منفی (اختیاری)

8. رد (اختیاری)

9. نمیدانم (اختیاری) (61)

س-2 : اوضاع فعلی اقتصادی ایران را چگونه ارزیابی میکنید؟

1. عالی

2. بسیار خوب

3. متوسط

4. کمی ضعیف

5. ضعیف

8. رد (اختیاری)

9. نمیدانم (اختیاری) (62)

س-3 : وضعیت اقتصادی خود را چگونه ارزیابی میکنید؟

1. عالی

2. بسیار خوب

3. متوسط

4. کمی ضعیف

5. ضعیف

8. رد (اختیاری)

9. نمیدانم (اختیاری) (63)

س-4 : به نظر شما آیا وضعیت اقتصادی شما در طول یک سال آینده بهتر خواهد شد یا بدتر؟

1. خیلی بهتر خواهد بود.

2. کمی بهتر خواهد شد.

3. تغییری نخواهد کرد.

4. کمی بدتر خواهد شد.

5. خیلی بدتر خواهد شد.

8. رد (اختیاری)

9. نمیدانم (اختیاری) (64)

س-5 : نقش ایده آل دولت در مدیریت اقتصاد چیست؟ (گزینه ها را بخوانید)

1. خصوصی سازی

2. مدیریت

3. توسعه همگانی و عمومی

4. ایجاد خودکفایی

5. ایجاد اشتغال

6. غیره (لطفا مشخص کنید:)

98. رد (اختیاری)

99. نمیدانم (اختیاری) (65-66)

س-6 : به نظر شما کدام کشور مناسبترین الگوی اقتصادی قابل پیگیری برای ایران را پیاده میکند؟ (تنها

یک جواب را علامت بزنید)؟

1. ژاپن

2. ایران

3. انگلستان (بریتانیا)

4. هیچکدام

97. غیره (لطفا مشخص کنید:)

98. رد (اختیاری)

99. نمیدانم (اختیاری) (67-68)

س-7 : همان طور که می دانید تحریمهای اقتصادی به روی ایران گذاشته شده است. به نظر شما آیا

تحریمهای اقتصادی بر روی ایران تاثیر مثبت /منفی داشته ؟ و یا اینکه بی تاثیر بوده؟

1. خیلی مثبت

2. کمی مثبت

3. نه مثبت و نه منفی

4. کمی منفی

5. خیلی منفی

8. رد (اختیاری)

9. نمیدانم (اختیاری) (69)

پرسشگر بخواند :

الان می خواهم از شما چند سوال درباره ایران و روابط بین المللی اش بپرسم.

س- 8 : هنگامی که صحبت از سر گرفتن روابط با ایالات متحده پیش می آید، چگونه افکاری به ذهن شما خطور میکند؟ (یک جواب را ثبت نمایید)

1. { همه جوابهایی که موافق با از سرگیری روابط باشد. }
2. { همه جوابهایی که با از سرگیری روابط به نحوی مخالف باشد. }
3. غیره

98. رد (اختیاری)

99. نمیدانم (اختیاری) (70-71)

س- 9 : آیا شما موافق با برقراری مجدد ارتباط با ایالات متحده امریکا هستید و یا مخالف؟

1. خیلی موافق
2. کمی موافق
3. نه موافق و نه مخالف
4. کمی مخالف
5. خیلی مخالف

8. رد (اختیاری)

9. نمیدانم (اختیاری) (72)

س- 10 : به طور شخصی موضوع برقراری مجدد ارتباط با ایالات متحده امریکا تا چه حدی برای شما اهمیت دارد؟

1. فوق العاده مهم
2. بسیار مهم
3. کمی مهم
4. هیچ اهمیتی ندارد

8. رد (اختیاری)

9. نمیدانم (اختیاری) (73)

س- 11 : هنگامی که صحبت از تاریخچه روابط ایران- امریکا پیش می آید، چگونه افکاری به ذهن شما خطور میکند؟ (یک جواب را ثبت نمایید)

98. رد (اختیاری)

99. نمیدانم (اختیاری) (74-75)

س-12: با انتخاب باراک اوباما به حیث رییس جمهور امریکا، به نظر شما آیا روابط ایران- امریکا خیلی بهتر خواهد شد- کمی بهتر خواهد شد- فرقی نخواهد کرد- کمی بدتر خواهد شد و یا خیلی بدتر خواهد شد؟

1. خیلی بهتر خواهد شد.
2. کمی بهتر خواهد شد.
3. تغییری نخواهد کرد.
4. کمی بدتر خواهد شد.
5. خیلی بدتر خواهد شد.

8. رد (اختیاری)

9. نمیدانم (اختیاری) (76)

س-13: اگر روابط ایران- امریکا دوباره از سر برقرار شود، شما طرفدار کدام یک از این موارد هستید؟ باز شدن مرکز حفاظت منافه امریکایی؟ و یا باز شدن سفارت این کشور در ایران؟

1. دفتر حفاظت منافه امریکایی
2. سفارت
3. هیچ کدام

8. رد (اختیاری)

9. نمیدانم (اختیاری) (77)

س-14: امریکا برای قائل شدن احترام بیشتر نسبت به ایران چه گامهایی را باید بردارد؟ (یک جواب مشخص ثبت گردد)

1. تحریمها را بردارد/لغو کند
2. در امور ایران دخالت نکند
3. دارایی های ایران را پس بدهد
4. با ایران کمک و همکاری کند
5. سیاستهای مخالف را کنار بگذارد
6. گرایشهای مخالف را کنار بگذارد
7. برنامه انرژی هسته ای ایران را قبول کند
8. هر خواسته ای را که دولت ایران دارد قبول کند (جدای از برنامه هسته ای)
9. روابط تجاری بیشتری با ایران داشته باشد
10. احترام متقابل داشته باشد.
11. افغانستان (یا عراق) را ترک کند
12. از اسرائیل حمایت نکند
13. امریکا باید صادق باشد
14. غیره

98. رد (اختیاری)

99. نمیدانم (اختیاری) (78-79)

س-15: در صورتیکه امریکا یک گفتگوی مستقیم را با ایران شروع نماید، آیا این نقطه قوت خیلی بزرگی برای امریکا به حساب خواهد آمد؟ تا حدی یک نقطه قوت به حساب خواهد آمد؟ نه نقطه قوتی خواهد بود- نه نقطه ضعفی؟ تا حدی یک نقطه ضعف به حساب خواهد آمد؟ یا کاملاً نقطه ضعفی خواهد بود؟

- 1- کاملاً نقطه قوت
- 2- تا حدی نقطه قوت
3. نه نقطه قوتی خواهد بود- نه نقطه ضعفی
4. تا حدی نقطه ضعف
5. کاملاً نقطه ضعف

8. رد (اختیاری)

9. نمیدانم (اختیاری) (80)

س-16: در صورتیکه ایران یک گفتگوی مستقیم را با امریکا شروع نماید، آیا این نقطه قوت کاملی برای ایران به حساب خواهد آمد؟ تا حدی یک نقطه قوت به حساب خواهد آمد؟ نه نقطه قوتی خواهد بود- نه نقطه ضعفی؟ تا حدی یک نقطه ضعف به حساب خواهد آمد؟ یا کاملاً نقطه ضعفی خواهد بود

- 1- کاملاً نقطه قوت
- 2- تا حدی نقطه قوت
3. نه نقطه قوتی خواهد بود- نه نقطه ضعفی
4. تا حدی نقطه ضعف
5. کاملاً نقطه ضعف

8. رد (اختیاری)

9. نمیدانم (اختیاری) (81)

س-17: در همین اواخر، رییس جمهور امریکا آقای اوباما در یکی از سخنرانیهایش به این نکته اشاره کرد که در سال 1953، در براندازی حکومت مصدق نخست وزیر وقت ایران که به طور دموکراتیک انتخاب شده بود، امریکا نیز نقش داشته است. در پاسخ به این اظهارات آقای اوباما چه چیزهایی به ذهن شما میرسد؟ (یک جواب مشخص ثبت گردد)

1. امریکا همیشه در امور ایران دخالت میکند/ کرده است
2. توضیحات و یا نظرات منفی دیگر
3. توضیحات و یا نظرات مثبت
4. هر نوع توضیح دیگر

98. رد (اختیاری)

99. نمیدانم (اختیاری) (82-83)

س-18: با در نظر داشتن وضعیت اقتصادی ایران، میدانیم که در حال حاضر ایران فقط با چند کشور روابط تجاری دارد. آیا شما خیلی موافق روابط عادی تجاری با امریکا هستید – کمی موافق روابط عادی تجاری با امریکا هستید – نه موافقید و نه مخالف- کمی مخالفید و یا خیلی مخالف؟

1. خیلی موافق
2. کمی موافق
3. نه موافقت و نه مخالف
4. کمی مخالف
5. خیلی مخالف

8. رد (اختیاری)
9. نمیدانم (اختیاری) (84)

س-19 : با تمرکز به جایگاه ایران در جامعه بین المللی , آیا فکر میکنید که ایران به طور جداگانه و تنها قرار گرفته و یا اینکه به خوبی جزوی از جامعه بین المللی شده است و جایگاه خود را یافته؟

1. تنها است
2. تا حدی جزوی از جامعه بین المللی است و جایی جایگاه خود را پیدا کرده
3. جایگاه خود را به خوبی یافته
4. جایگاه خود را کاملاً یافته و جزوی از جامعه بین المللی است.

8. رد (انتخابی)
9. نمیدانم (انتخابی) (85)

س-20 : لطفاً به من بگویید که راجع به هر یک از موارد زیر نظرتان خیلی مطلوب/ کمی مطلوب/ نه مطلوب و نه نامطلوب/ کمی نامطلوب و یا خیلی نامطلوب است؟

91	اطلاعات	نمیدانم (اختیاری)	رد (اختیاری)	خیلی نامطلوب	کمی نامطلوب	نه مطلوب و نه نامطلوب	کمی مطلوب	خیلی مطلوب	
1	86	9	8	5	4	3	2	1	الف. دولت فعلی امریکا
2	87	9	8	5	4	3	2	1	ب. مردم امریکا
3	88	9	8	5	4	3	2	1	ج. سیاست امریکا نسبت به ایران
4	89	9	8	5	4	3	2	1	د. باراک اوباما
5	90	9	8	5	4	3	2	1	ر. تأثیرات فرهنگی امریکا در داخل ایران

س-21:

می خواهم از شما چند سوال بپرسم درباره چند اتفاق مختلف. لطفاً بفرمایید که هر کدام از این اتفاقات چه نوع عکس العمل و یا نگرشی در مورد امریکا در ذهن شما به وجود می آورد؟ آیا نگرش شما درباره امریکا در رابطه با موارد زیر بسیار مثبت است- تا حدی مثبت است- نه مثبت است و نه منفی- تا حدی منفی است و یا خیلی منفی است

97	اطلاعات	نمیدانم (اختیاری)	رد (اختیاری)	خیلی نامطلوب	کمی نامطلوب	نه مطلوب ونه نامطلوب	کمی مطلوب	خیلی مطلوب	
1	92	9	8	5	4	3	2	1	الف. عکس العمل آمریکا نسبت به انتخابات رئیس جمهوری اخیر ایران
2	93	9	8	5	4	3	2	1	ب. نقش امریکا در انقلاب اسلامی سال 1357 ایران
3	94	9	8	5	4	3	2	1	ج. سیاستهای آقای اباما در رابطه با برقراری مجدد ارتباطات ایران و امریکا
4	95	9	8	5	4	3	2	1	د. جایگاه آمریکا در طول جنگ ایران-عراق
5	96	9	8	5	4	3	2	1	ر. نقش آمریکا در کودتای سال 1332 در ایران

س-22: می‌خواهم از شما چند سوال بپرسم در مورد روشی که شما درباره اتفاقات نام برده شده اطلاعات کسب کرده‌اید. آیا شما از هر طریق تجربه دست اول – از منابع تحصیلی مانند کلاسها و یا کتابها – از افراد خانواده – از دوستان- از رسانه های دولتی ایران ویا از رسانه های غیر دولتی کسب کرده اید.

نمیدانم (انتخابی)	رد (انتخابی)	از رسانه های غیر دولتی	از رسانه های دولتی ایران	– از دوستان	از افراد خانواده	از منابع تحصیلی مانند کلاسها و یا کتابه	تجربه دست اول	
9	8	6	5	4	3	2	1	الف. عکس العمل امریکا نسبت به انتخابات رئیس جمهوری اخیر ایران
9	8	6	5	4	3	2	1	ب. نقش امریکا در انقلاب اسلامی سال 1357 ایران
9	8	6	5	4	3	2	1	ج. سیاستهای آقای ایاما در رابطه با برقراری مجدد ارتباطات ایران و امریکا
9	8	6	5	4	3	2	1	د. جایگاه امریکا در طول جنگ ایران-عراق
9	8	6	5	4	3	2	1	ر. نقش امریکا در کودتای سال 1332 در ایران

حال می‌خواهم چند سوال در مورد موضوع هسته‌ای کشور بپرسم.

س-23: آیا شما با توسعه انرژی هسته‌ای غیر نظامی توسط جمهوری اسلامی ایران کاملاً موافق- کمی موافق- نه موافق و نه مخالف- کمی مخالف و یا کاملاً مخالف هستید

1. کاملاً موافق
2. کمی موافق
3. نه موافق و نه مخالف
4. کمی مخالف
5. کاملاً مخالف

8. رد (اختیاری)
9. نمی‌دانم (اختیاری) (104)

س-24: جدا از انرژی هسته‌ای، آیا شما با توسعه سلاح‌های هسته‌ای توسط جمهوری اسلامی ایران کاملاً موافق- کمی موافق- نه موافق و نه مخالف- کمی مخالف و یا کاملاً مخالف هستید

1. کاملاً موافق
2. کمی موافق
3. نه موافق و نه مخالف
4. کمی مخالف
5. کاملاً مخالف

8. رد (اختیاری)
9. نمی‌دانم (اختیاری) (105)

س-25: تعدادی از مردم براین عقیده‌اند که داشتن/ صاحب انرژی هسته‌ای بودن یک حق ملی است، در حالی که دیگران هم عقیده نیستند. کدام یک از این دو نظر به عقیده شما نزدیکتر است؟

1. داشتن انرژی هسته‌ای یک حق ملی است
2. داشتن انرژی هسته‌ای یک حق ملی نیست

8. رد (اختیاری)
9. نمی‌دانم (اختیاری) (106)

س-26: جدای از انرژی هسته‌ای، تعدادی از مردم براین عقیده‌اند که داشتن/ صاحب سلاح‌های هسته‌ای بودن یک حق ملی است، در حالی که دیگران براین باور نیستند. کدام یک از این دو نظر به عقیده شما نزدیکتر است؟

1. داشتن سلاح هسته‌ای یک حق ملی است
2. داشتن سلاح هسته‌ای یک حق ملی نیست

8. رد (اختیاری)
9. نمیدانم (اختیاری) (107)

س-27: آیا شما در انتخابات ریاست جمهوری خرداد سال 1388 ایران رأی دادید؟

1. بله

2. خیر

8. رد (اختیاری)

9. نمیدانم (اختیاری) (108)

س-28: (در صورت جواب بله به سوال 27) در هنگام رأی دادن کدام یک از این موارد برایتان بیشترین اهمیت را داشت؟ (گزینه ها را بخوانید، بگذارید طرف مقابل جواب خود را بدهد. تنها یک گزینه را علامت بزنید)

1. اقتصاد

2. روابط ایران- آمریکا

3. مسائل اجتماعی/ دینی

4. برنامه هسته ای

5. انتخابات معتبر

5. امنیت کشور

96. پرسیده نشد.

97. غیره (لطفا مشخص کنید:)

98. رد (انتخابی)

99. نمیدانم (انتخابی) (109-110)

س-29: به نظر شما آیا منافع ایران و آمریکا اکثراً مشترک هستند؟ اکثراً مختلف هستند؟ و یا مخلوطی از هر دو؟

1. اکثراً مشترک هستند؟ (بروید به سوال 30)

2. اکثراً مختلف هستند؟ (بروید به سوال 31)

3. به طور کلی مخلوطی از هر دو (سوالات 30 و 31 هر دو پرسیده شود)

8. رد (اختیاری)

9. نمیدانم (اختیاری) (111)

س-30: { در صورتیکه پاسخگو در سوال 29 گزینه 1 و یا 3 را انتخاب کرده باشد } به نظر شما منافع هر دو کشور ایران- آمریکا در مورد کدام موضوع از همه به هم نزدیکتر است؟ (گزینه ها را بخوانید)

1. عراق

2. افغانستان

3. القاعده

4. امنیت خلیج فارس

5. همکاری انرژی

6. همکاری تجاری و اقتصادی

7. مجادله اسرائیل- فلسطین

8. نفت

9. مساله هسته ای

97. غیره (لطفا مشخص کنید:)

98. رد (انتخابی)

99. نمیدانم (انتخابی) (112-113)

س-31 : { در صورتیکه پاسخگو در سوال 29 گزینه 2 و یا 3 را انتخاب کرده باشد} در کدام موضوع بیشترین اختلاف بین منافع دو کشور ایران- امریکا وجود دارد؟ (گزینه ها را بخوانید)

1. عراق

2. افغانستان

3. القاعده

4. امنیت خلیج فارس

5. همکاری انرژی

6. همکاری تجاری و اقتصادی

7. مجادله اسرائیل- فلسطین

8. نفت

9. مساله هسته ای

97. غیره (لطفا مشخص کنید:)

98. رد (انتخابی)

99. نمیدانم (انتخابی) (114-115)

ستونهای 115-130 به طور عمدی خالی گذاشته شده.

بخش آمار

پرسشگر این جملات را برای پاسخگو بخواند: ازینکه وقتتان را در اختیار ما گذاشتید بسیا متشکرم. فقط چند تا سوال کوتاه دیگر مانده که باید بپرسم و بعد از آن پرسشنامه به اتمام میرسد.

(از همه پرسیده شود)

D1. جنسیت پاسخ دهنده ؟

1- مرد

2- زن (131)

D-2. سن حقیقی _____ (132-133)

D-3. وضعیت شغلی شما چیست؟ آیا شما.....

1. تمام وقت کار می کنید (40 ساعت و بیشتر)
2. نیمه وقت کار می کنید (زیر 40 ساعت)
3. کار نمی کنید-دنبال کار می گردید
4. کار نمی کنید-دنبال کار نمی گردید
5. خانه دار (بیرون از منزل کار نمی کند)
6. دانش آموز/کارآموز
7. بازنشسته/ناتوان

97. غیره (اختیاری)

98. جواب رد (بر حسب اختیار)

99. نمی دانم (134-135)

D-4. (از اشخاصی که در پاسخ سوال 3 جواب تمام وقت و یا نیم وقت داده اند بپرسید): کار شما.....

- | | |
|-------------|---------------------------------|
| 1 | صاحب شرکت |
| 2 | کارمند شرکت دولتی |
| 3 | در بنیاد |
| 4 | شرکت خصوصی با کمتر از 10 کارمند |
| 5 | شرکت خصوصی با بیش از 10 کارمند |
| 96 | پرسیده نشد |
| 97 | دیگر |
| 98 | جواب رد (بر حسب اختیار) |
| 99(136-137) | نمی دانم (بر حسب اختیار) |

5. D- (از اشخاصی که در پاسخ سوال 3 جواب تمام وقت و یا نیم وقت داده اند بپرسید) : شغل اصلی شما چیست؟

- 1 صاحب شرکت بزرگ
- 2 مدیر عامل شرکت
- 3 مدیر بخش
- 4 حرفه ای- با تخصص
- 5 کارمند شرکت حرفه ای
- 6 کارمند دفتری ساده
- 7 سر کارگر- متخصص فنی- تکنیسین
- 8 کارگر با تخصص
- 9 کارگر با کمی تخصص
- 10 کارگر ساده
- 11 افسر- بخش نظامی
- 12 غیر افسر- بخش نظامی
- 13 کارمند دولت
- 14 کشاورز- ماهی گیر
- 15 کارگر کشاورز بدان زمین شخصی
- 16 مغازه دار- صاحب مغازه کوچک

96 پرسیده نشد

98 جواب رد

99 نمی دانم (138-139)

D-6a (از همه پرسیده شود) چند سال تحصیلی رسمی را به پایان رساندید؟ (چند سال حقیقی)

_____ (140-141)

D-6b (از همه پرسیده شود) سطح تحصیل شما چیست؟

1	خواندن و نوشتن نمی داند
2	هیچ تحصیل رسمی ندارد اما خواندن و نوشتن می داند
3	دبستان (به پایان رسانده یا یک مقدار خوانده)
4	راهنمایی (به پایان رسانده یا یک مقدار خوانده)
5	دبیرستان را یک مقدار خوانده
6	دبیرستان را تمام کرده/ دیپلمه
7	دانشگاه تمام نکرده ترک تحصیل
8	دانشگاه تمام کرده/ لیسانسه

(142)

D-7 تابع کدام مذهب می باشید؟ (توضیح ندهید)

1. شیعه اسلام
2. سنی اسلام
3. مسلمان
-
7. غیره
8. جواب رد (اختیاری)
9. نمی دانم (143)

8D- (از همه پرسیده شود) میزان درآمد ماهانه خانواده شما از همه منابع بطور تقریبی چه است؟ منظورم درآمد مجموعی همه افرادی است که در این آدرس زندگی میکنند. از پایه.....

(داده ها را بخوانید)

100000 تومان و یا کمتر	1
100,001-150,000 تومان	2
150,001-200,000 تومان	3
200,001-400,000 تومان	4
400,001-600,000 تومان	5
600,00-800,00 تومان	6
800,000 به بالا	7
جواب رد (بر حسب اختیار)	8
نمی دانم (144)	9

D-9

سطح اجتماعی خانواده خود را چگونه شرح می‌دهید؟

1	(A/B) طبقه بالا
2	(C1, C2) طبقه متوسط
3	(D) طبقه کارگر
4	(E) طبقه پایین (فقر ۱)
8	رد جواب
9	نمیدانم (145)

D-10 . آیا می‌توانم در مورد نژاد شما سوال بکنم ؟

- 1 فارس
- 2 آذری
- 3 گیلکی و مازندرانی
- 4 کرد
- 5 عرب
- 6 لر
- 7 بلوچ
- 8 ترکمن

97. غیره (لطفا مشخص کنید).....

98. رد (انتخابی)

99. . نمیدانم (انتخابی) (147-146)

D-11

شما به چه زبانهای می‌توانید یک برنامه رادیویی را تماشا کنید و زبان آن برنامه را بفهمید؟ اگر زبان دیگری نام برده شد
بپرسید- دیگر چه زبانی؟ (چندی مورد رامی توان علامت بزنید)

اطلاعات	نمیدانم (اختیاری)	رد (اختیاری)	نخیر	بله	
148	9	8	2	1	الف. فارسی
149	9	8	2	1	ب. آذری
150	9	8	2	1	ج. کردی
151	9	8	2	1	د. عربی
152	9	8	2	1	ذ. ترکی
153	9	8	2	1	ر. ترکی
154	9	8	2	1	ز. انگلیسی
155	9	8	2	1	ژ. فرانسوی
156	9	8	2	1	آلمانی
157	9	8	2	1	غیره

D-12. آیا تمایل به اشتراک در بررسی های دیگرمان در طول سال دارید ؟

- | | |
|---|-----------|
| 1 | بلی |
| 2 | خیر (158) |

لطفا زمانی را که مصاحبه به اتمام رسیده و نیز مدت مصاحبه را به طور دقیق قید کنید(با استفاده از فرمت 24 ساعته).

جمله اتمام را برای پاسخدهنده بخوانید:

"از شرکت شما در مصاحبه بسیار متشکرم. شما سوالی دارید؟ طی چند روز آینده بازبین (ناظر) من ، در به جهت ارزشیابی کیفی کار من و همچنین در رابطه با بعضی از جوابهایتان با شما تماس خواهد گرفت

مشخصات مصاحبه شونده: نام:.....

D-13. مصاحبه گر : کدام یک از جملات زیر به صورت بهتری میزان تفهیم پاسخگو را از مفهوم این پرسشنامه تشریح میکند؟

1. پاسخگو همه سنوالات را فهمید.
2. پاسخگو بیشتر سنوالات را فهمید.
3. پاسخگو بیشتر سنوالات را فهمید ولی کمی کمک لازم داشت.
4. پاسخگو به سختی بیشتر سنوالات را می فهمید حتی با کمک من. (159)

D-14. مصاحبه گر: کدام یک از جملات زیر به صورت بهتری میزان راحتی یا اضطراب پاسخگو را در مورد این پرسشنامه تشریح میکند؟

1. پاسخگو با تمامی سئوالات این پرسشنامه راحت بود.
2. پاسخگو با بیشتر سئوالات این پرسشنامه راحت بود.
3. پاسخگو فقط با بعضی از سئوالات این پرسشنامه راحت بود.
4. پاسخگو به طور کلی نسبت به بیشتر سئوالات این پرسشنامه نا راحت بود. (160)

D-15. (کد مصاحبه گر): به نظر شما در طول مصاحبه چه نوع سنوالاتی باعث ناراحتی یا عدم همکاری این پاسخگو شد؟

(لطفاً آزاد و صریح بنویسید)

الف. اولین نوع سنوال ----- (161-162)

ب. دومین نوع سنوال ----- (163-164)

پ. سومین نوع سنوال ----- (165-166)

98. رد (انتخابی)

99. . نمیدانم (انتخابی)

D-16 مصاحبه گر: در صورتی که هر گونه توضیحی، موردی ویا انتقادی نسبت به جوابهایی که از پاسخگو گرفته شده دارید در این قسمت بنویسید:

D-17. آیا پاسخ‌دهنده به سوالها مشتاقانه و به صورت منصفانه جواب داده است؟

1. بله

2. خیر (167)

این قسمت توسط سویروایزر پر شود:

D-18 آیا این مصاحبه شامل شرایطی بود که باعث شدند مصاحبه تحت ارزیابی کیفی قرار بگیرد و کنترل دوباره از آن بعمل بیاید؟

1. بلی

2. خیر (168)

D-19 روش ارزیابی کیفی / کنترل دوباره

1. نظارت مستقیم در طول مصاحبه

2. کنترل دوباره از طرف دفتر مرکزی

3. در این مورد صدق نمیکند (169)

Correlations Between Demographic Variables

In this appendix, we discuss the relationships between each of the demographic variables examined in the survey. The statistical correlations can be found on the web page link provided at the end of this appendix.

The relationship between comfort level and class is not straightforward. Those who rated themselves as either upper class or poor were judged as most comfortable, and those who rated themselves as middle or working class were judged as less comfortable. Other personal characteristics of the respondents tended to correlate in more-straightforward ways, and these relationships should be kept in mind when examining the results. Specifically, education and class were correlated as one would expect: Educated respondents were more likely to rate themselves as middle or upper class than as working class or poor, and vice versa for less-educated respondents. Education and income were also correlated as one would expect, with more-educated respondents reporting that they earn more income than less-educated respondents reported. Income and class were correlated as expected: Respondents earning higher levels of income were more likely to rate themselves as middle or upper class than as poor or working class, and vice versa for respondents earning lower levels of income. Regarding level of urbanization, major metropolitan areas were more likely to contain middle-class respondents than working-class or poor respondents, and vice versa for villages. In addition, major metropolitan areas were more likely to contain educated respondents than less-educated respondents, and vice versa for villages. Furthermore, major metropolitan areas were more likely to contain respondents earning higher levels of income than lower levels, and vice versa for villages. Finally, men reported earning a higher income than women reported. All other correlations between demographic factors were nonsignificant. For details on the correlations between demographic factors, please see http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR910.html.

Multinomial Logistic Regression Models

Model 1. Examining Whether Ratings of Iran's Current Economic Situation Differed Depending on Ratings of One's Personal Economic Situation, Class, Gender, or Level of Urbanization

Using both the weighted and unweighted data, we tested a multinomial logistic regression model of whether ratings of the current economic situation in Iran depended on how positively or negatively respondents rated their personal economic situation, on their class, on their gender, or on their level of urbanization. For both the dependent variable (i.e., ratings of the overall economy) and ratings of one's personal economic situation, we collapsed the "excellent" and "very good" options into one category, and did the same for "somewhat poor" and "poor." According to the model, respondents' overall views of the economy only depended on their views of their personal economic situation and not on their class, gender, or level of urbanization (see Table G.1). That is, the better that respondents rated their own personal economic situation, the better they rated the economy overall.

For both the weighted and unweighted data, all regression coefficients were significant at the 0.01 level.

Note that, for each predictor, we examined the coefficients corresponding to each combination of response options (i.e., one response option from the predictor variable and one response option from the dependent variable) to determine how many are statistically significant. We excluded coefficients corresponding to the "refused" and "don't know" options for either the predictor variable or the dependent variable. From the set of coefficients that remained, we determined whether at least half reached statistical significance. If they did, we considered the predictor to be a moderately strong one. On the other hand, if 80 percent of the coefficients were significant, we considered the predictor to be a strong one.

In testing this model and the others that follow, we considered possible alternative explanations that may truly account for the variation in ratings of the overall economic situation. Specifically, we measured the following factors in the survey to control for these in the regression analyses:

- all demographic characteristics of the respondents
- interviewer effects (i.e., the possibility that some interviewers may have elicited certain responses to all questions)
- respondents' comfort level with the entire survey, as judged by the interviewers
- respondents' comprehension of the survey, as judged by the interviewers
- whether the respondents were candid, as judged by the interviewers

Table G.1
Opinions on the Current Economic Situation in Iran (Control Group: Good)

	Fair			Poor			Refused			Don't Know		
	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig
Unweighted												
(Intercept)	-42.2	1.2	*	25.6	2.5	*	-15.8	0.0	*	-59.5	0.1	*
Opinions on one's personal economic situation (control group: good)												
Fair	1.8	0.4	*	2.7	0.5	*	15.9	0.0	*	27.5	0.0	*
Poor	2.7	0.6	*	5.3	0.7	*	18.3	0.0	*	25.6	0.0	*
Don't know	-81.8	N/A		212.5	0.0	*	2.0	0.0	*	7.2	0.0	
Weighted												
(Intercept)	-93.7	1.3	*	51.2	2.6	*	-35.2	0.0	*	-156.5	0.0	*
Opinions on one's personal economic situation (control group: good)												
Fair	1.9	0.4	*	2.7	0.5	*	55.9	0.0	*	56.4	0.0	*
Poor	2.9	0.6	*	5.4	0.7	*	59.9	0.0	*	68.4	0.0	*
Don't know	-191.6	N/A		464.7	N/A		3.7	0.0		10.3	0.0	

NOTES: * = significant at $p < 0.05$. Coef = coefficient. SE = standard error. Sig = significance of the coefficient (i.e., whether significant or not). N/A signifies that the standard error could not be calculated due to a lack of degrees of freedom.

- the number of calls it took to reach each respondent
- the time of day each at which interview was held
- the length of each interview.

Among these covariates, job type (within the demographic characteristics) accounted for a significant amount of variance in ratings of the overall economy (i.e., compared with owners of large businesses, those holding any other type of job rated the overall economy worse). In addition, years of formal education had a significant effect on the dependent variable in that greater years of education corresponded to worse ratings of the economy. Comfort level with the survey also had a significant effect: Compared with more-comfortable respondents, less-comfortable respondents were more likely to rate the economy as neutral than as positive. Furthermore, the length of the interview had a significant effect: Compared with respondents whose interviews were shorter, respondents whose interviews were longer tended to rate the economy more positively. Finally, the time of day at which the interview began had a significant effect: Respondents who were reached during the afternoon hours tended to rate the economy as worse than respondents reached during the first hour of calling. The companion website supplies detailed statistics regarding each of these covariates.

Model 2. Multinomial Logistic Regression: Examining Whether Support or Opposition to Reestablishing Relations with the United States Depends on Attitudes Toward the Current U.S. Government, the American People, U.S. Policies Toward Iran, Barack Obama, and/or American Cultural Influences Within Iran

Using both the weighted and unweighted data, we tested a multinomial logistic regression model of whether support or opposition to reestablishing relations with the United States depended on attitudes toward the current U.S. government, the American people, U.S. policies toward Iran, Barack Obama, and/or American cultural influences within Iran. According to the model, respondents' support or opposition to reestablishing relations depended only on their attitudes toward the American people and the Obama administration (see Table G.2). For example, compared with respondents who held unfavorable attitudes toward the American people, respondents who held favorable attitudes toward the American people tended to support reestablishing relations with the United States. In addition, compared with respondents who held unfavorable attitudes toward the Obama administration, those who held favorable attitudes toward the Obama administration tended to support reestablishing relations with the United States. Because "the American people" and "the Obama administration" represent personalized images of the United States, Iranians might find that these images resonate with them in a more personal way than do other topics and concepts that are more esoteric.

Note that, for each predictor, we examined the coefficients corresponding to each combination of response options (i.e., one response option from the predictor variable and one response option from the dependent variable) to determine how many are statistically significant. We excluded coefficients corresponding to the "refused" and "don't know" options for either the predictor variable or the dependent variable. From the set of coefficients that remained, we determined whether at least half reached statistical significance. If they did, we

Table G.2
Opinions on Reestablishing U.S.-Iranian Relations (Control Group: Very in Favor)

	Somewhat in Favor			Neither in Favor Nor Opposed			Somewhat Opposed			Very Opposed			Refused			Don't Know		
	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig
Unweighted																		
(Intercept)	-0.4	1.4		-27.4	1.9	*	-32.7	1.5	*	74.1	2.0	*	-18.2	0.2	*	-29.5	0.1	*
Opinions on the current U.S. government (control group: very favorable)																		
Somewhat favorable	0.7	1.0		-1.1	1.2		2.7	1.7		0.7	1.1		-0.3	0.1	*	-3.7	0.0	*
Neither in favor nor opposed	0.6	1.0		-0.8	1.1		1.8	1.7		-0.1	1.0		-19.9	0.1	*	5.6	0.0	*
Somewhat unfavorable	1.3	1.0		0.6	1.1		3.5	1.6	*	1.3	1.0		-9.3	0.0	*	14.1	0.1	*
Very unfavorable	0.9	1.0		0.5	1.1		3.0	1.5		2.0	0.9	*	-13.5	0.0	*	1.1	0.0	*
Refused	2.0	2.4		0.7	2.7		4.9	2.8		2.2	2.3		-7.3	0.0	*	50.0	0.1	*
Don't know	2.1	1.1		-0.2	1.4		1.7	1.9		0.5	1.2		-6.6	0.0	*	1.9	0.0	*
Opinions on the American people (control group: very favorable)																		
Somewhat favorable	1.1	0.5	*	0.8	0.6		1.9	0.6	*	1.0	0.5	*	-2.5	0.1	*	1.1	0.0	*
Neither in favor nor opposed	1.8	0.6	*	2.3	0.6	*	3.1	0.8	*	2.6	0.6	*	4.2	0.1	*	10.6	0.0	*
Somewhat unfavorable	0.7	0.8		1.8	0.9	*	3.6	0.9	*	1.8	0.7	*	9.9	0.0	*	-0.1	0.1	
Very unfavorable	-0.4	1.1		2.1	0.9	*	2.8	1.0	*	2.3	0.8	*	7.5	0.0	*	5.2	0.0	*
Refused	-9.5	0.0	*	33.9	0.0	*	14.3	N/A		56.8	0.0	*	2.7	0.0	*	5.2	0.0	*
Don't know	-0.4	0.7		1.3	0.8		0.7	1.0		1.2	0.7		5.4	0.0	*	8.8	0.1	*

Table G.2—Continued

	Somewhat in Favor			Neither in Favor Nor Opposed			Somewhat Opposed			Very Opposed			Refused			Don't Know		
	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig
Opinions on U.S. policies toward Iran (control group: very favorable)																		
Somewhat favorable	1.4	1.3		−1.2	1.8		−3.2	2.2		−0.1	1.3		11.5	0.1	*	0.7	0.0	*
Neither in favor nor opposed	0.8	1.2		0.7	1.5		−0.2	1.9		0.7	1.2		−0.1	0.3		7.9	0.0	*
Somewhat unfavorable	1.4	1.2		0.5	1.5		0.1	1.8		0.9	1.2		0.9	0.1	*	3.6	0.0	*
Very unfavorable	1.8	1.1		1.6	1.4		1.3	1.8		1.9	1.1		3.0	0.0	*	9.5	0.1	*
Refused	20.9	1.4	*	21.8	1.5	*	−5.6	0.0	*	21.2	1.3	*	47.7	0.0	*	4.9	0.0	*
Don't know	1.5	1.4		1.5	1.7		−0.9	2.1		1.5	1.4		4.8	0.0	*	14.9	0.0	*
Opinions on Barack Obama (control group: very favorable)																		
Somewhat favorable	1.7	0.8	*	3.5	1.1	*	4.2	1.6	*	2.1	0.9	*	−8.5	0.1	*	5.8	0.1	*
Neither in favor nor opposed	3.0	0.8	*	4.4	1.1	*	3.5	1.5	*	3.2	0.9	*	2.9	0.2	*	−3.6	0.0	*
Somewhat unfavorable	2.7	0.9	*	3.3	1.1	*	3.2	1.5	*	2.8	0.9	*	−9.0	0.0	*	17.7	0.0	*
Very unfavorable	1.7	0.9	*	1.7	1.1		1.8	1.4		2.0	0.9	*	4.2	0.1	*	9.9	0.0	*
Refused	22.6	1.2	*	25.2	1.3	*	−19.9	N/A		22.6	1.3	*	2.3	0.0	*	−3.0	0.0	*
Don't know	1.9	0.9	*	2.7	1.2	*	3.7	1.6	*	1.7	1.0		−0.8	0.0	*	26.4	0.0	*

Table G.2—Continued

	Somewhat in Favor			Neither in Favor Nor Opposed			Somewhat Opposed			Very Opposed			Refused			Don't Know		
	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig
Opinions on American cultural influences within Iran (control group: very favorable)																		
Somewhat favorable	-1.3	1.1		0.6	1.7		-1.3	1.9		-2.1	1.0	*	1.1	0.0	*	7.1	0.0	*
Neither in favor nor opposed	-1.0	1.0		1.7	1.6		-1.4	1.8		-1.6	0.9		15.4	0.3	*	0.6	0.1	*
Somewhat unfavorable	-0.6	1.0		1.3	1.6		1.6	1.8		-0.8	0.9		-1.7	0.0	*	3.7	0.1	*
Very unfavorable	0.0	1.0		2.7	1.5		2.4	1.7		-0.1	0.8		8.7	0.1	*	8.2	0.1	*
Refused	-2.7	2.6		0.3	3.3		-24.2	0.0	*	-74.2	0.0	*	-10.9	0.0	*	23.1	0.0	*
Don't know	-0.4	1.2		3.3	1.8		2.4	1.9		0.6	1.1		14.6	0.0	*	6.1	0.0	*
Weighted																		
(Intercept)	-0.5	1.4		-26.2	2.0	*	-29.9	1.5	*	72.4	2.1	*	-18.1	0.7	*	-28.1	0.5	*
Opinions on the current U.S. government (control group: very favorable)																		
Somewhat favorable	0.6	1.0		-1.4	1.2		2.5	1.7		0.7	1.1		0.3	0.3		-4.2	0.0	*
Neither in favor nor opposed	0.5	1.0		-1.1	1.1		1.7	1.7		-0.2	1.0		-18.0	0.1	*	5.0	0.0	*
Somewhat unfavorable	1.4	1.0		0.4	1.1		3.6	1.6	*	1.3	1.0		-9.0	0.1	*	13.8	0.1	*
Very unfavorable	0.8	1.0		0.4	1.1		3.0	1.5	*	2.1	0.9	*	-12.2	0.2	*	0.8	0.1	*
Refused	2.1	2.5		0.6	2.8		4.9	2.8		2.4	2.4		-6.8	0.1	*	47.6	0.2	*
Don't know	2.2	1.1	*	-0.3	1.4		1.8	1.9		0.7	1.2		-3.4	0.0	*	3.3	0.1	*

Table G.2—Continued

	Somewhat in Favor			Neither in Favor Nor Opposed			Somewhat Opposed			Very Opposed			Refused			Don't Know		
	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig
Opinions on the American people (control group: very favorable)																		
Somewhat favorable	1.1	0.5	*	0.9	0.6		1.9	0.6	*	1.1	0.5	*	−2.0	0.1	*	1.8	0.2	*
Neither in favor nor opposed	1.9	0.6	*	2.3	0.6	*	3.2	0.8	*	2.7	0.6	*	4.1	0.7	*	10.3	0.1	*
Somewhat unfavorable	1.0	0.8		1.9	0.9	*	3.8	0.9	*	2.0	0.7	*	7.7	0.1	*	−0.5	0.2	*
Very unfavorable	−0.3	1.1		2.2	0.9	*	2.9	1.0	*	2.5	0.8	*	9.6	0.1	*	5.2	0.2	*
Refused	−8.8	0.0	*	32.7	N/A		14.3	0.0	*	54.6	N/A		0.4	N/A		5.3	0.0	*
Don't know	−0.4	0.7		1.3	0.8		0.6	1.0		1.2	0.7		5.4	0.1	*	8.7	0.1	*
Opinions on U.S. policies toward Iran (control group: very favorable)																		
Somewhat favorable	1.3	1.3		−1.3	1.8		−3.3	2.3		−0.1	1.3		10.3	0.1	*	0.4	0.1	*
Neither in favor nor opposed	0.8	1.2		0.9	1.5		−0.2	1.9		0.5	1.2		−0.8	0.2	*	6.9	0.0	*
Somewhat unfavorable	1.4	1.1		0.7	1.5		0.1	1.8		0.7	1.2		0.1	0.2		2.6	0.1	*
Very unfavorable	1.8	1.1		1.7	1.4		1.3	1.8		1.7	1.1		2.2	0.3	*	9.3	0.3	*
Refused	20.7	1.4	*	22.0	1.5	*	−8.9	0.0	*	21.0	1.3	*	45.1	0.1	*	4.5	0.0	*
Don't know	1.3	1.4		1.7	1.7		−1.0	2.1		1.4	1.4		3.5	0.1	*	13.8	0.1	*

Table G.2—Continued

	Somewhat in Favor			Neither in Favor Nor Opposed			Somewhat Opposed			Very Opposed			Refused			Don't Know		
	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig
Opinions on Barack Obama (control group: very favorable)																		
Somewhat favorable	1.8	0.8	*	3.4	1.1	*	4.2	1.6	*	2.1	0.9	*	-7.0	0.2	*	5.1	0.1	*
Neither in favor nor opposed	3.1	0.9	*	4.1	1.0	*	3.3	1.5	*	3.1	0.9	*	3.4	0.4	*	-2.3	0.1	*
Somewhat unfavorable	2.7	0.9	*	2.9	1.1	*	3.0	1.5	*	2.6	0.9	*	-7.9	0.0	*	16.2	0.1	*
Very unfavorable	1.7	0.9		1.4	1.1		1.7	1.4		1.8	0.9	*	3.3	0.4	*	9.0	0.0	*
Refused	21.5	1.2	*	23.5	1.3	*	-20.8	0.0	*	21.0	1.3	*	-0.2	0.0	*	-3.2	0.0	*
Don't know	1.9	0.9	*	2.4	1.2	*	3.7	1.6	*	1.6	1.0		-2.7	0.0	*	23.6	0.0	*
Opinions on American cultural influences within Iran (control group: very favorable)																		
Somewhat favorable	-1.2	1.1		0.8	1.8		-1.3	1.9		-1.9	1.0		0.5	0.0	*	6.9	0.2	*
Neither in favor nor opposed	-1.0	1.0		1.9	1.6		-1.4	1.8		-1.5	0.9		15.9	0.5	*	2.0	0.1	*
Somewhat unfavorable	-0.6	1.0		1.3	1.6		1.6	1.8		-0.6	0.9		-0.7	0.1	*	3.8	0.1	*
Very unfavorable	0.0	1.0		2.7	1.6		2.3	1.7		0.0	0.9		9.3	0.2	*	7.1	0.4	*
Refused	-2.6	2.7		0.7	3.4		-28.2	0.0	*	-69.1	N/A		-8.9	0.0	*	22.2	0.0	*
Don't know	-0.3	1.2		3.3	1.8		2.5	1.9		0.6	1.1		13.4	0.0	*	5.9	0.1	*

NOTES: * = significant at $p < 0.01$. N/A signifies that the standard error could not be calculated due to a lack of degrees of freedom.

considered the predictor to be a moderately strong one. On the other hand, if 80 percent of the coefficients were significant, we considered the predictor to be a strong one.

In testing this model, we controlled for the same set of covariates as in the first model. Among these covariates, employment status (within the demographic characteristics) accounted for a significant amount of variance in the dependent variable, although the relationship is not straightforward (see the companion website for detailed statistics). In addition, primary occupation (survey question D-5) accounted for variance in the dependent variable but not in a straightforward way (see the companion website for detailed statistics). The time of day at which the interview began accounted for a significant amount of variance: Respondents who were reached during the afternoon hours tended to be more in favor of reestablishing relations than respondents reached during the first hour of calling.

Model 3. Multinomial Logistic Regression: Examining Whether Support or Opposition to Reestablishing Relations with the United States Depends on Attitudes Toward the U.S. Response to the Presidential Elections, the U.S. Role in the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Barack Obama's Policies Regarding Reestablishing U.S.-Iranian Relations, the U.S. Position During the Iran-Iraq War, and the U.S. Role in the 1953 Coup

Using both the weighted and unweighted data, we tested a multinomial logistic regression model of whether support or opposition to reestablishing relations with the United States depended on attitudes toward the U.S. response to the presidential elections, the U.S. role in the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Barack Obama's policies regarding reestablishment of U.S.-Iranian relations, the U.S. position during the Iran-Iraq War, and the U.S. role in the 1953 coup. We predicted that attitudes toward both historical and current events would play an equal role in accounting for attitudes toward reestablishing relations with the United States. The results showed that only attitudes on current policies of the Obama administration on reestablishing U.S.-Iranian relations predicted support for or opposition to reestablishing relations with the United States (see Table G.3). For example, compared with those who held negative attitudes toward the Obama administration's policies on reestablishing U.S.-Iranian relations, more of those who held positive attitudes also tended to support reestablishing those relations. Attitudes toward the U.S. role in the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the U.S. position during the Iran-Iraq War, the U.S. role in the 1953 coup in Iran, and the U.S. response to the recent presidential elections in Iran did not predict support for or opposition to reestablishing relations. Because the American people and the Obama administration represent personalized images of the United States, Iranians might find that these images resonate with them in a more personal way than do other topics and concepts that are more esoteric. It is possible that respondents reacted more strongly to the personalized image of Barack Obama on reestablishing relations as opposed to the other topics, which require a more sophisticated understanding of current and historical events than can be obtained through state media and education.

Note that, for each predictor, we examined the coefficients corresponding to each combination of response options (i.e., one response option from the predictor variable and one response option from the dependent variable) to determine how many are statistically significant. We excluded coefficients corresponding to the "refused" and "don't know" options for either the predictor variable or the dependent variable. From the set of coefficients that

Table G.3
Opinions on Reestablishing U.S.-Iranian Relations (Control Group: Very in Favor)

	Somewhat in Favor			Neither in Favor Nor Opposed			Somewhat Opposed			Very Opposed			Refused			Don't Know		
	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig
Unweighted																		
(Intercept)	9.5	1.4	*	-29.6	1.8	*	-18.3	1.4	*	65.4	1.9	*	-6.7	0.3	*	-12.6	0.2	*
Opinions on the U.S. response to the recent presidential elections in Iran (control group: very positive)																		
Somewhat positive	0.5	1.2		1.4	1.3		-0.3	1.5		0.7	1.1		16.2	0.0	*	-6.4	0.0	*
Neither in favor nor opposed	2.1	1.0	*	2.1	1.0	*	0.1	1.3		0.9	0.9		-7.4	0.0	*	-6.5	0.0	*
Somewhat negative	1.3	1.0		1.3	1.1		1.6	1.3		0.3	1.0		-5.2	0.1	*	2.8	0.1	*
Very negative	1.9	0.9	*	2.2	1.0	*	-0.1	1.1		1.5	0.8		1.8	0.1	*	4.6	0.0	*
Refused	-0.1	3.0		3.3	2.9		-24.5	0.0	*	-1.8	2.5		-13.5	0.1	*	-9.6	0.0	*
Don't know	1.9	1.1		3.4	1.2	*	-0.3	1.6		1.1	1.0		4.6	0.2	*	3.2	0.0	*
Opinions on the U.S. role in the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran (control group: very positive)																		
Somewhat positive	-1.0	1.2		2.6	1.6		0.4	2.0		-1.6	1.4		27.2	0.0	*	23.4	0.1	*
Neither in favor nor opposed	-2.2	0.9	*	0.9	1.2		-2.8	1.4	*	-1.9	0.9	*	5.7	0.0	*	15.9	0.0	*
Somewhat negative	-0.9	1.0		1.4	1.3		1.0	1.3		-1.1	1.0		14.1	0.1	*	9.9	0.1	*
Very negative	-1.2	0.8		1.9	1.2		-0.7	1.1		-0.3	0.8		6.8	0.2	*	12.0	0.0	*
Refused	-3.5	1.6	*	-0.2	2.1		-57.4	0.0	*	-3.6	1.8	*	-9.1	0.1	*	-26.7	0.0	*
Don't know	-3.2	1.0	*	-0.5	1.4		-2.7	1.5		-2.0	1.0	*	7.5	0.1	*	-6.1	0.0	*

Table G.3—Continued

	Somewhat in Favor			Neither in Favor Nor Opposed			Somewhat Opposed			Very Opposed			Refused			Don't Know		
	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig
Opinions on Barack Obama's policies regarding the reestablishment of U.S.-Iranian relations (control group: very positive)																		
Somewhat positive	2.3	0.6	*	1.0	0.7		1.8	1.3		1.8	0.7	*	-11.4	0.1	*	9.5	0.1	*
Neither in favor nor opposed	2.4	0.6	*	1.4	0.7	*	2.8	1.2	*	2.3	0.6	*	5.5	0.1	*	6.9	0.0	*
Somewhat negative	3.0	0.7	*	1.9	0.8	*	5.5	1.3	*	3.6	0.7	*	0.6	0.0	*	24.9	0.2	*
Very negative	2.0	0.6	*	1.5	0.6	*	3.8	1.2	*	2.9	0.5	*	-5.4	0.1	*	16.8	0.1	*
Refused	-3.2	3.5		-1.3	2.7		-23.5	0.0	*	-4.8	3.0		1.2	0.1	*	38.3	0.0	*
Don't know	2.1	0.7	*	1.0	0.9		3.5	1.4	*	2.5	0.8	*	6.3	0.2	*	27.0	0.0	*
Opinions on the U.S. position during the Iran-Iraq War (control group: very positive)																		
Somewhat positive	-0.3	1.6		-5.6	2.2	*	-2.4	2.0		-0.9	1.6		-14.2	0.0	*	-6.9	0.0	*
Neither in favor nor opposed	-0.8	1.3		-1.3	1.5		-2.1	1.9		0.8	1.2		-10.7	0.1	*	-19.7	0.0	*
Somewhat negative	-0.6	1.3		-1.8	1.5		-1.3	1.6		-0.3	1.3		-19.9	0.0	*	-10.6	0.1	*
Very negative	-0.3	1.1		-2.2	1.3		-0.3	1.4		0.3	1.0		-14.1	0.2	*	-5.6	0.1	*
Refused	39.1	2.8	*	34.3	5.0	*	-16.4	N/A		37.0	2.8	*	67.2	0.1	*	49.3	0.0	*
Don't know	-0.1	1.4		-0.7	1.5		-2.0	1.9		0.9	1.3		1.6	0.1	*	2.8	0.1	*

Table G.3—Continued

	Somewhat in Favor			Neither in Favor Nor Opposed			Somewhat Opposed			Very Opposed			Refused			Don't Know		
	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig
Opinions on the U.S. role in the 1953 coup in Iran (control group: very positive)																		
Somewhat positive	−1.3	1.4		−0.8	1.5		−2.0	1.7		−0.7	1.3		−5.9	0.0	*	2.1	0.0	*
Neither in favor nor opposed	−2.0	1.2		−2.5	1.4		−4.5	1.7	*	−2.9	1.1	*	−15.5	0.0	*	12.7	0.0	*
Somewhat negative	−1.1	1.3		−3.5	1.6	*	−6.0	1.7	*	−2.4	1.2		−14.8	0.0	*	1.5	0.1	*
Very negative	−1.3	1.1		−2.6	1.2	*	−4.4	1.4	*	−2.6	1.0	*	−10.5	0.2	*	−8.9	0.0	*
Refused	−2.7	3.3		−4.1	7.9		2.5	3.5		3.3	2.8		−9.2	0.1	*	−0.2	0.0	*
Don't know	−0.7	1.1		−1.4	1.2		−3.3	1.4	*	−2.0	1.0		−10.1	0.3	*	−6.0	0.0	*
Weighted																		
(Intercept)	11.0	1.4	*	−32.4	1.8	*	−20.1	1.5	*	74.8	1.9	*	−7.2	0.5	*	−14.4	0.4	*
Opinions on the U.S. response to the recent presidential elections in Iran (control group: very positive)																		
Somewhat positive	0.4	1.2		1.2	1.4		−0.2	1.5		0.6	1.1		18.6	0.0	*	−5.7	0.0	*
Neither in favor nor opposed	2.1	1.0	*	2.2	1.1	*	0.1	1.3		1.0	0.9		−7.3	0.0	*	−7.3	0.1	*
Somewhat negative	1.3	1.0		1.2	1.2		1.5	1.4		0.3	1.0		−5.9	0.1	*	3.3	0.2	*
Very negative	2.0	0.9	*	2.3	1.0	*	−0.1	1.2		1.6	0.8		1.9	0.2	*	5.7	0.1	*
Refused	0.1	3.1		3.7	2.9		−27.9	0.0	*	−1.7	2.5		−14.0	0.2	*	−10.2	0.0	*
Don't know	1.8	1.1		3.4	1.2	*	−0.4	1.6		1.0	1.1		5.2	0.3	*	4.3	0.1	*

Table G.3—Continued

	Somewhat in Favor			Neither in Favor Nor Opposed			Somewhat Opposed			Very Opposed			Refused			Don't Know		
	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig
Opinions on the U.S. role in the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran (control group: very positive)																		
Somewhat positive	−1.1	1.1		2.8	1.6		0.4	2.0		−1.6	1.4		30.0	0.1	*	25.2	0.1	*
Neither in favor nor opposed	−2.2	0.9	*	1.1	1.3		−2.6	1.4		−1.9	0.9	*	6.8	0.1	*	17.6	0.1	*
Somewhat negative	−0.9	1.0		1.6	1.3		1.1	1.3		−1.0	1.0		16.7	0.1	*	10.6	0.2	*
Very negative	−1.4	0.8		2.0	1.2		−0.7	1.2		−0.2	0.8		8.4	0.3	*	12.5	0.0	*
Refused	−3.7	1.6	*	−0.2	2.1		−64.7	0.0	*	−3.8	1.8	*	−8.3	0.2	*	−29.6	0.0	*
Don't know	−3.2	1.0	*	−0.2	1.4		−2.4	1.5		−2.0	1.0	*	8.5	0.1	*	−6.8	0.0	*
Opinions on Barack Obama's policies regarding the reestablishment of U.S.-Iranian relations (control group: very positive)																		
Somewhat positive	2.4	0.6	*	1.0	0.7		1.9	1.3		1.9	0.7	*	−12.2	0.2	*	11.1	0.1	*
Neither in favor nor opposed	2.5	0.6	*	1.4	0.7	*	2.8	1.3	*	2.3	0.6	*	6.3	0.1	*	9.3	0.0	*
Somewhat negative	3.3	0.7	*	2.2	0.8	*	5.7	1.3	*	3.8	0.8	*	1.9	0.1	*	28.0	0.3	*
Very negative	2.0	0.6	*	1.4	0.6	*	3.8	1.2	*	3.0	0.6	*	−5.1	0.2	*	19.4	0.1	*
Refused	−2.0	3.3		−1.3	2.7		−22.6	0.0	*	−3.8	2.9		1.7	0.2	*	43.9	0.0	*
Don't know	2.4	0.7	*	1.0	0.9		3.6	1.4	*	2.6	0.8	*	6.9	0.3	*	31.0	0.0	*

Table G.3—Continued

	Somewhat in Favor			Neither in Favor Nor Opposed			Somewhat Opposed			Very Opposed			Refused			Don't Know		
	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig	Coef	SE	Sig
Opinions on the U.S. position during the Iran-Iraq War (control group: very positive)																		
Somewhat positive	−0.4	1.6		−5.9	2.2	*	−2.4	2.1		−1.0	1.6		−15.0	0.1	*	−7.2	0.1	*
Neither in favor nor opposed	−0.9	1.4		−1.2	1.5		−2.3	1.9		0.7	1.2		−11.2	0.1	*	−22.3	0.0	*
Somewhat negative	−0.6	1.3		−1.7	1.5		−1.1	1.7		−0.1	1.3		−20.6	0.0	*	−11.7	0.2	*
Very negative	−0.4	1.1		−2.3	1.3		−0.3	1.4		0.3	1.0		−15.4	0.2	*	−6.6	0.1	*
Refused	41.9	2.5	*	36.7	4.5	*	−18.2	N/A		39.8	2.5	*	75.0	0.2	*	54.5	0.0	*
Don't know	−0.4	1.4		−0.8	1.5		−2.5	2.0		0.8	1.3		1.6	0.1	*	2.2	0.0	*
Opinions on the U.S. role in the 1953 coup in Iran (control group: very positive)																		
Somewhat positive	−1.1	1.4		−0.5	1.5		−2.0	1.8		−0.7	1.3		−6.8	0.1	*	2.8	0.0	*
Neither in favor nor opposed	−1.8	1.2		−2.3	1.4		−4.4	1.7	*	−2.8	1.1	*	−15.7	0.1	*	14.5	0.0	*
Somewhat negative	−1.0	1.3		−3.3	1.6	*	−5.9	1.8	*	−2.4	1.3		−15.2	0.0	*	2.3	0.3	*
Very negative	−1.3	1.1		−2.5	1.2	*	−4.5	1.4	*	−2.6	1.0	*	−11.0	0.3	*	−8.8	0.1	*
Refused	−3.4	3.2		−4.0	7.1		2.0	3.4		2.6	2.7		−15.2	0.1	*	−0.3	0.0	*
Don't know	−0.6	1.1		−1.3	1.2		−3.3	1.5	*	−1.9	1.0		−11.5	0.4	*	−6.4	0.1	*

NOTES: * = significant at $p < 0.01$. N/A signifies that the standard error could not be calculated due to a lack of degrees of freedom.


remained, we determined whether at least half reached statistical significance. If they did, we considered the predictor to be a moderately strong one. On the other hand, if 80 percent of the coefficients were significant, we considered the predictor to be a strong one.

In testing this model, we controlled for the same set of covariates as in the first and second models. Among these covariates, employment status (within the demographic characteristics) accounted for a significant amount of variance in the dependent variable, although the relationship is not straightforward (see the companion website for detailed statistics). In addition, primary occupation (D-5) accounted for variance in the dependent variable but not in a straightforward way (see the companion website for detailed statistics). The time of day at which the interview began accounted for a significant amount of variance: Respondents who were reached during the afternoon hours tended to be more in favor of reestablishing relations than respondents reached during the first hour of calling.

Detailed Figures


Figures H.1–H.5 present more-detailed versions of figures that appear in the main body of this report. These charts include categories that represent extremely small numbers of people. Such categories contained too few people to warrant depicting them in the main body.

Figure H.1
Opinions on How Sanctions Have Affected the Iranian Economy Differ by Class




RAND TR910-H.1

Figure H.2
Support for and Opposition to Developing Nuclear Weapons Differ by Education Level



RAND TR910-H.2

Figure H.3
Support for and Opposition to Developing Nuclear Weapons Differ by Age



RAND TR910-H.3

Figure H.4
Support for and Opposition to Reestablishing Relations with the United States Differ by Education Level





Figure H.5
Support for and Opposition to Reestablishing Relations with the United States Differ by Class



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